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Linda M. Van de Oucht 
Cynthia Van Rulle 
We model the entrepreneurial firm's choice of  debt finance, allowing for debt renegotiations in the 
event of  financial distress.  We differentiate two sources of  debt finance, bank debt and trade credit, 
by the implicit equity stake that lenders hold in the borrowing firm.  Lenders with a large implicit 
equity stake, such as suppliers, may adopt a more lenient liquidation policy for their debtors, but 
then set a higher price for their credit.  Entrepreneurs, who have private information about their 
probability of  financial distress, borrow exclusively from lenders with a small implicit equity stake, 
such as banks, only when the price advantage of  bank debt outweighs the cost of a stricter 
enforcement of liquidation rights.  Entrepreneurs who prefer the lenient liquidation policy adopted 
by suppliers contract only partial bank finance in order to avoid a potential default against the bank 
later on.  We show that the traction of debt that consists of bank loans depends upon the cash flow 
in the bad state, the value attributed to control rights and the initial wealth and risk aversion of  the 
entrepreneur. 
JEL: C70, G32, G33 1.  Introduction 
The benefits of  bank financing have been documented widely in the finance literature, both 
theoretically and empirically.  These benefits include screening of prospective clients (Diamond 
(1991)), monitoring (Diamond (1984), Rajan and Winton (1995)), efficient liquidation 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Repullo and Suarez (1998», and efficient renegotiation of debt 
contracts (Smith and Warner (1979), Berlin and Loeys (1988)).  Rajan (1992) was the first to point 
out that there are costs associated with bank financing: banks may obtain bargaining power over the 
firm's profits once projects have begun.  This bargaining power stems from the information 
monopoly that banks develop during their ongoing relationship with their client firms.  As a result, 
it is costly for firms to switch lenders, and banks can extract rents from their borrowers when 
renewing short-telID loans.  Even though competition ensures that the rents banks are expected to 
extract ex post are reflected ex ante in lower rates (Sharpe (1990)), bank debt remains costly 
because it distorts investment incentives. 1 
In this paper, we emphasize another cost of  bank financing.  We argue that banks may adopt 
a stricter liquidation policy for firms that default than some other credit providers do.  The reason is 
that banks have a relatively small implicit equity stake in the firms to which they provide credit. 
Other creditors, such as suppliers, may have a larger implicit equity stake and, hence, may adopt a 
more lenient liquidation policy for firms that default.  When entrepreneurs have private information 
about their quality, i.e. their probability not to default, we show that high quality entrepreneurs -
provided that their quality exceeds a certain threshold - may prefer to borrow exclusively from 
banks to minimize their financing cost.  Low quality entrepreneurs with substantial benefits from 
control, on the other hand, may limit their bank borrowings to avoid a potential default against the 
I  There is  empirical evidence that supports the  idea that banks exploit debtors during ongoing relationships.  Petersen 
and Rajan (1994), for  instance, find that bank relationships reduce the interest rate on  bank loans to small firms by  less 
than  the  true  decline  in  cost  from  improved  borrower quality.  They  interpret this  as  evidence that the  information 
generated  during the  relationship  is  private to  the  lender and  not transferable  by  the  borrower to  other financiers. 
Similar conclusions are made in Petersen and Rajan (1997).  For large, listed firms, Houston and James (1996) find that 
firms, when setting their mix of private versus public debt, take into account that their monitoring lender may obtain an 
information monopoly if it is the only informed lender. bank that would result in the liquidation of  their firm.  We develop this argument in a model of debt 
financing choices made by start-up firms.  For new firms in traditional industrial sectors, the 
external financing sources usually are limited to debt financing, in particular bank loans and trade 
credit.2  The results of  the model, however, also hold for other types of debt financing that can be 
distinguished by their implicit equity stake, such as leasing.3 
The key role of  the liquidation policy of banks in structuring a firm's debt has been stressed 
before (e.g., Chernmanur and Fulghieri (1994), Repullo and Suarez (1998) and others).  Our model, 
however, is driven by differences in implicit equity stakes and not by the lenders' differential 
information gathering abilities, as in Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) and Repullo and Suarez 
(1998).  Furthermore, the impact of  the liquidation value of  assets and entrepreneurial wealth on the 
debt structure differs in our model compared to Repullo and Suarez (1998), where firms with a low 
assets' liquidation value and wealthy entrepreneurs rely less on bank finance. 
While we argue that banks follow a strict liquidation policy, empirical studies have found 
evidence that banks, compared to public bondholders, tend to be more lenient towards firms in 
financial distress (e.g., Gilson, John and Lang (1990), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990)). 
The common explanation is that public debt is difficult and costly to renegotiate, which could 
induce public debtholders to favor liquidation for firms that default, independent of  whether or not 
this is optimal (e.g., Gertner and Scharfstein (1991 )).4  However, for new start-up firms, the public 
debt market is not a viable alternative for bank debt.  Carey, Post and Sharpe (1998) is the first 
empirical paper to compare different types of  private lenders.  They find that banks tend to forsake 
from financing riskier borrowers and conjecture that both regulatory and reputation-based 
explanations might drive these results.  Their explanation is supply driven, i.e. banks have reasons 
2 Berger and  Udell (1998) discuss the sources of  financing that firms can contract, according to firm age.  In 
Continental Europe. venture capital can only be raised by finms in specific industries and venture capitalists typically 
finance finn, inlhe growth stage (Ooghe, Manigart and Fassin (1991), Van Hulle (1998), Black and Gilson (1998)). 
] After controlling for differences in the risk characteristics of  borrowing firms. Carey, Post and Sharpe (1998) find that 
the rates charged by finance companies are similar to the rates charged by banks.  Therefore, leasing companies could 
be considered as tinanciers who hold a rather small implicit equity stake in their borrowers.  However, leasing is only 
available or some specific types of investments (e.g., Smith and Wakeman (1985)). 
2 not to extend credit to firms that they perceive as being of  high risk.  Our model, on the other hand, 
is demand driven, i.e. we posit that entrepreneurs with important control rents may limit their bank 
borrowings to avoid defaulting against their bank.  Instead, these entrepreneurs contract debt 
finance from creditors who hold a larger implicit equity stake in their borrowers and, hence, adopt a 
more lenient liquidation policy.s  While Petersen and Rajan (1997) already suggested that banks 
and suppliers, due to a different implicit equity stake, might adopt a different enforcement of 
liquidation rights for firms that default, we examine the implications of  such a different liquidation 
policy for entrepreneurs who decide on contracting debt finance.  A related model is by Wilner 
(2000), who also argues that dependent (trade) creditors may grant more concessions in debt 
renegotiations than nondependent credit market lenders.  Though, he finds that firms with a larger 
probability of  default unconditionally are willing to pay the higher trade credit rate, while we find 
that this result only holds under specific circumstances, i.e. when the firm's liquidation value is 
likely to exceed its going concern value following default and when control rents are substantial. 
Furthermore, and unlike the model of  Wilner (2000), we find that the optimal debt structure may 
consist of  a combination of  bank loans and trade credit.  Also, this optimal debt structure is found 
to be firm specific and to depend upon the bad state cash flow, the value attributed to control rights, 
entrepreneurial wealth and risk aversion.  Using data on a sample of 152 true business start-ups in 
the manufacturing sector, we provide empirical evidence that supports this theoretical model. 
Our model develops as follows.  We consider a risk averse entrepreneur who sets up a 
limited liability firm.  The entrepreneur has insufficient personal funds to iinance the input goods 
required at start-up and hence needs €l of external finance.  The funds can be acquired either 
through a bank loan or trade credit.  The entrepreneur decides to contract a fraction a of  external 
(debt) finance as trade credit, while a fraction (I - a) is borrowed from the bank.  The purpose of 
, The literature therefore posits that private lenders are better suited than public debt providers are to finance firms that 
are risky and unknown. 
; Franks and Sussman (2000) [md that banks prove very tough in debt renegotiations with distressed SMEs and that 
trade creditors expand the amount of  credit during the period of  distress, even when it ends in formal bankruptcy. Also, 
Evans (1998) finds that trade creditors grant more concessions to customers in financial distress than banks do. 
3 our model is to determine how the entrepreneur, having private information about her quality, will 
detennine the size of  the trade credit (a) and the bank loan «1 - a)).  As the market for bank debt is 
highly competitive (e.g., Amel and Liang (1992), Remolona and Wulfekuhler (1992), Benink and 
Llewellyn (1994)), banks hold only a small implicit equity stake in their borrowers.6  Suppliers 
with a larger implicit equity stake in their debtors have a larger interest in the survival of  their 
customers and, therefore, are willing to adopt a more lenient liquidation policy towards their 
debtors once the latter default on their c1aims.7  Consequently, they attract the higher risk debtors 
and the price of  trade credit will reflect that higher credit risk.  This result is consistent with 
Petersen and Raj an (1994) and Biais and Gollier (1997), who find that vendor financing is more 
expensive than institutional finance. 
First, we consider a strictly constrained entrepreneur who must invest all of  her personal 
wealth in the firm (equity) to meet the minimum equity contribution for limited liability firms. 8 
Our results show that the debt structure of  the entrepreneurial firm is determined by trading off  the 
lower price of  bank debt against the more lenient liquidation policy of suppliers: high quality 
entrepreneurs, provided that their quality exceeds a certain threshold, prefer to borrow exclusively 
from the bank to limit their financing cost.  Low quality entrepreneurs, for whom the strict 
liquidation policy associated with bank debt dominates its price advantage, demand only partial 
bank financing.  These latter entrepreneurs limit their bank borrowings such that they will always 
be able to pay off  their bank debt even if  they become fmancially distressed, while allowing them 
to make maximum use of  cheaper bank debt.  We find that higher control rents increase the value 
of being allowed to reorganize following default, thereby increasing the lower limit on 
entrepreneurial quality for entrepreneurs to borrow exclusively from the bank. 
6 Increased competition in the banking sector since the 1980s has been attributed to increased desintermediation, 
international izatioll. changing customer preferences, and deregulation, which led to excess capacity for banks. 
7 We acknowledge that our model does not hold in highly competitive markets for input goods, where the supplier's 
rrofit margin on his sales is negligible. 
Note that entrepreneurs who cannot raise this minimum are not observed; these firms simply do not start up. 
4 Second, we consider the situation where the entrepreneur is only weakly constrained: her 
personal wealth exceeds the minimum equity contribution for limited liability firms, but cannot 
cover all expenses so that at start-up, some portion of external finance must still be contracted.  If 
the realized cash flows cannot cover the financial expenses at the end of  the period, the weakly 
constrained entrepreneur might be able to bring in additional equity to facilitate a reorganization 
and, thus, prevent liquidation.  We find that weakly constrained entrepreneurs have an incentive to 
limit their equity contribution at start-up to the minimum required by law - unless they wish to 
provide a quality signal - because of risk aversion.  The separating equilibrium of  the former 
strictly constrained entrepreneur model is preserved, but we find that the separating condition on 
entrepreneurial quality is decreasing in entrepreneurial wealth, demonstrating that wealthier 
entrepreneurs may prefer to borrow exclusively from the bank, ceteris paribus. 
We also show that two additional separating equilibria result when the entrepreneur is only 
weakly constrained.  First, if  both high and low quality entrepreneurs find it too costly to borrow 
exclusively from the bank - because the bank will liquidate their firm following default - high 
quality weakly constrained entrepreneurs may still have an incentive to dissociate themselves from 
lower quality ones by bringing in more equity at start-up and/or increasing the fraction of  debt 
finance that is bank credit; quality signaling will allow the high quality entrepreneur to minimize 
the price of  external finance.  However, the quality signal that is given by contracting more bank 
debt at start-up will only be credible if  there is no doubt that once the firm becomes distressed, 
additional equity will be brought in to prevent liquidation by the bank; therefore, a specified 
incentive compatibility constraint should be satisfied.  Given that this condition is fulfilled, we 
show that high quality entrepreneurs are indifferent between using leverage and the debt mix to 
signal their quality.  Second, ifboth high and low quality entrepreneurs find it optimal to borrow 
exclusively from the bank at start-up, high quality weakly constrained entrepreneurs may still have 
an incentive to signal their higher quality by bringing in more equity at start-up.  Though, we also show that when entrepreneurs have substantial personal wealth and highly value control rights, they 
may no longer be able to credibly signal their quality by means of  their debt ratio. 
Our model is developed in the remainder of  the paper.  In section II, we present the 
background of  the model: the payoff characteristics of the project, the different players, the 
infomlation available at the different stages in the game, the credit rates and the liquidation policy 
of  the lenders.  In Section III, we determine how a strictly constrained entrepreneur decides on 
structuring external (debt) finance.  The weakly constrained case is presented in Section IV. 
Section V offers empirical support for this model.  The final section of  the paper offers some 
conclusions. 
II.  The Model 
A.  The Project 
The firm engages in a one period project.9  External financing through a bank loan and/or 
trade credit is required at start-up (time 0) to purchase input goods from a supplier.  The project 
generates a (stochastic) cash flow that may be distributed among the creditors at time 1. I 0  The 
value of  this cash flow depends on the state of  nature that has realized in the following way. 
In the good state of  nature, the cash flow available for distribution equals Xo, which is large 
enough to fully payoff  all debtholders at time 1, independent of  the debt structure that was 
assumed at start-up.  The remainder of  the cash flow is fully paid out to the entrepreneur (the 
equityholder).  The project is considered terminated and the associated assets are liquidated at time 
I for a value of  L, which is also distributed to the entrepreneur. I I 
In the bad state of  nature, XB is available for distribution among the creditors at time 1. 
Regardless of  the chosen debt structure, XB is insufficient to fully payoff all debtholders and hence 
9 As the project is a one period project, the maturity structure of  debt is an irrelevant issue in the context of  our model. 
10 This cash flow available for distribution among the creditors at time 1 is equal to sales: all operational cash flows, 
except for those input goods financed through trade credit and/or a bank loan, have already been financed at start-up 
(equity). 
II (X" + L) can also be interpreted as the present value ofa perpetual stream. 
6 the firm defaults on at least some of  its claims.  Following default, the remaining debtholders must 
decide whether to liquidate or reorganize the firm.  If they decide to liguidate the firm, Lis 
distributed among the remaining claimholders at time I according to previously established priority 
rules; e.g., if  the bank took out a mortgage on the firm's assets at start-up, L is first used to payoff 
the defaulted bank loan.  So, while the entrepreneur has some discretion in the distribution of  XB 
between the firm's creditors, L is distributed according to previously established priority rules. 
If  the remaining creditors decide to reorganize their defaulted claims at time 1, they allow 
the entrepreneur to restart the project, which requires a new infusion of  external funds to finance 
the purchase of  new input goods.  Since all cash available (XB) has been distributed at time 1, these 
new input goods have to be financed with either new trade credit or a new bank loan.  This new 
debt legally receives first priority on the project's cash flows realized by time 2.12 In this case, the 
cash flow available for distribution at time 2 to the holders of  the reorganized claims isX  G andXB 
in the good and bad state, respectively.  In other words, XG and X B are net of  the repayment of  the 
new debt that was granted at time I: X G,B = max{salel  G,B - repayment of  new debt, O}, which 
shows that X aB may not be sufficient to pay off  the new and the reorganized debt at time 2. 13•14 
Following default and reorganization at time 1, the good state of  nature will realize at time 2 with 
probability 0, and the bad state with probability (1- (5), in which caseXB equals zero (a 
nonnalization). 
" This assumption is consistent with U.S,  law whereby DIP financiers extending credit during a Chapter II 
reorganization obtain a super  priority status (Franks et al. (1996)). In Belgium, creditors who provide new funds during 
the com1 supervised reorganization procedure also obtain superpriority. 
" Note that the new debt claims do not need to consist oftrade credit: if  the bank agrees to finance the new purchases 
of input goods at time I, then the supplier faces no uncertainty concerning the realization of  his implicit equity stake. 
Also, the bank claims originated at time 1 now have the highest rank and, thus, will be paid off  at time 2 before the 
claims that were reorganized at time I are redeemed anything.  The irrelevancy of  who finances the new purchases of 
input goods at time I results from the fact that X"  G and its distribution at time 2 among external financiers that 
reorganized their impaired claims are unaffected by the identity of  the financier who finances these purchases necessary 
to make a reorganization possible. 
,.,  If investment timing is important (e.g"  because of  first mover advantages) andlor financial distress is costly then the 
value of  the firm's sales in the good state at time 2 will be smaller than the value of  the sales the firm would have 
real ized in the good state at time I. 
7 B. Agents and Information 
There are three rational agents in the model: the entrepreneur, the bank and the supplier. 
The bank and the supplier are risk neutral; they maximize their expected payoff.  The entrepreneur 
is risk averse and maximizes her expected utility of  wealth.  A simple utility function that can serve 
our purpose is the logarithmic function, whereby the utility of  expected wealth is greater than the 
expected utility of  wealth.  As the entrepreneur derives no utility - rather than some negative 
amount of utility, which is conceptually difficult to interpret - from zero wealth, we will use the 
logarithm of  (I + wealth) as the entrepreneur's utility function. 
There are two types of  entrepreneurs in the popUlation: high quality and low quality ones. 
Entrepreneurs have private information about their own quality.  A fraction a of  the population of 
entrepreneurs is of  high quality while a fraction (1 - a) is oflow quality.  Conditional on being a 
high quality entrepreneur, there is a probability of  1fH that the good state of  nature will realize at 
time 1.  Conditional on being a low quality entrepreneur, there is a probability of  1fL that the good 
state of  nature will realize at time 1. 
At time 0, the entrepreneur knows her own quality while external financiers only know that 
a fraction a of  the population of  entrepreneurs is of  high quality, and a fraction (1 - a) is oflow 
quality.  Therefore, both the bank's and the supplier's ex ante estimate of  the probability that XG 
will be realized at time 1 equals  () = a1f  H  + (1-a)1fI..  In traditional industrial sectors, this 
common prior assumption is likely to hold (e.g., Allen and Gale (1999)); here, it is used to 
demonstrate that our results are not driven by the lenders' differential information gathering 
abilities.  All agents know at time 0 that if  XB is realized at time I and the firm is allowed to 
reorganize following default, there is a probability of 0 (I - b) that X G (X  B) will be available for 
distribution at time 2. 15  Hence, all information asymmetries between the entrepreneur and the 
external financiers have been resolved by time 1. 
"One can think of our modeling of  the venture as a period during which entrepreneurs learn how to manage a firm. 
Entrepreneurs of high intrinsic quality have a good chance of  ending up in the good state of  nature attime 1 while 
8 C.  Credit Rates 
The riskless interest rate is zero, which means that there is no compensation for time value 
(normalization).  Due to high competitive pressure in the bank loan market (e.g., Amel and Liang 
(1992), Remolona and Wulfekuhler (1992), Benink and Llewellyn (1994», banks do not earn 
(high) rents on their lending activities.  In our model, bank rents are normalized to zero.  Trade 
credit is offered by suppliers to promote sales (e.g., Chant and Walker (1988)).  We assume that 
suppliers also earn zero expected profits on their lending activities, which allows us to isolate the 
pricing of  trade credit from the pricing of input goods and thus analytically tackle the model.  The 
bank and the supplier charge an interest rate Rb and Rt, respectively, that compensates them only for 
credit risk.  The credit risk that each lender faces will depend upon the manner in which the 
entrepreneur chooses to allocate the realized cash flow XB at time 1 between the creditors and, 
hence, may be different for banks compared to suppliers. 16  In addition, the credit risk of  a bank 
loan is not necessarily related to the bank's perception ofthe firm's business risk (8).  For instance, 
if  the amount required to pay off the bank loan at time I does not exceedXB, and the bank 
anticipates that it is in the entrepreneur's best interest to first payoff  the bank loan, then the bank 
faces no credit risk, independent of e. 
We assume that while the trade credit market is competitive, the input market of  the 
entrepreneur (i.e., the output market of  the supplier) is not.  In other words, the supplier is able to 
earn rents on the sale of  his products, from which he derives his implicit equity stake.  For 
simplicity, the supplier is presumed to be a monopolist, who therefore sets the product price that is 
charged under immediate payment (i.e., no trade credit used) such that marginal revenue equals 
entrepreneurs oflow intrinsic quality are more likely to default.  However, independent of their ex ante intrinsic quality 
(Jr,),  entrepreneurs who default at time I have learned somehow to manage a firm so that with probability 6, the 
entrepreneurial firm will be able to reach the good state by time 2.  In our model, the probability that the good stale of 
nature will realize at time 2 following default and reorganization at time  I (i.e., 0) does not depend on the probability 
that the good state of nature will realize at time 1 (i.e., n-,).  Though, we could elaborate the model to take into account 
that these two probabilities are interrelated across entrepreneurs.  However, this would only complicate the notation of 
the model without affecting its basic results. 
16 Note that the allocation of  the cash flow Xc; realized in the good state of nature at time I between the creditors is not 
relevant since all creditors can be fully paid off  in that state. 
9 marginal cost.  The price that is charged under delayed payment (i.e., when trade credit is used) is 
determined simultaneously and set such that expected marginal revenue equals marginal cost17  In 
this manner, the supplier is indifferent between customers who pay immediately and customers 
who use trade credit.  Both prices are specified in the contract and the supplier leaves the choice 
between immediate and delayed payment up to his customers.  The difference between the price for 
immediate and delayed payment determines the price of  trade credit (R t), and corresponds to zero 
expected profits in the trade credit market.  As it is legally forbidden to adjust trade credit terms to 
individual finns, which would circumvent the regulation on price discrimination,18 the supplier sets 
an average price for trade credit such that no profits are earned on vendor financing.  This means 
that there is only one price for trade credit in our model.  To set this average price, the supplier 
needs to anticipate which firms will make use of  trade credit and to what extent in order to break 
even in the trade credit market. 
D.  Liquidation versus Reorganization 
Following the realization of the bad state of nature at time 1, external financiers on whose 
claims the entrepreneurial firm defaulted, have to decide whether or not they will reorganize their 
impaired claims.  Before we consider the forces that drive the reorganization/liquidation decision of 
external financiers, we discuss under what conditions the entrepreneur will prefer reorganization to 
liquidation.  If creditors decide to liquidate the firm following default, the entrepreneur will receive 
nothing since L is insufficient to fully cover the defaulted claims. 19 
On the other hand, if external financiers decide to reorganize their defaulted claims, the 
entrepreneur will derive some private benefits from being able to continue her firm (control rents). 
17  As the supplier is a monopolist. the strategy to centralize demand every period and to produce only on order, such 
that his marginal cost differs from zero, is dominant. 
" See art.  81  and 82 of the European Treaty (1997 version) for competition crossing state boundaries of  member states 
orthe European Community. which has also been adopted in Belgian legislation for national competition.  In the U.S., 
the Robinson-Patman Act (1936) legally forbids price discrimination. 
19 This corresponds to assuming that XR + L < 1,  i.e., the total amount offunds that can be (and is) distributed at time I 
among the external financiers following default and liquidation (i.e., the cash flow from operational activities XH and 
the liquidation proceeds L) is  insufficient to fully pay off all debtholders. 
10 In the literature (e.g., Aghion and Bolton (1992), Hamilton (2000)), control rents have been defined 
as the various non-pecuniary aspects related to entrepreneurship; they could for instance result from 
the utility that the entrepreneur derives from managing her own firm.  In our model, the value of 
entrepreneurial control rents at time 2 is erG in the good state and c'B in the bad state.20  As the 
utility that an entrepreneur derives from running a firm presumably is increasing in that firm's 
performance, we assume that erG> er  B,  the latter being normalized to zero.21  The presence of 
control rents implies the following about the entrepreneur's preference for reorganization to 
liquidation following the realization of  the bad state of  nature: if  she does not have to bring in 
additional equity at time I to make a reorganization possible - because at start-up, debt was 
structured such that creditors with impaired claims will decide to reorganize - she will prefer 
reorganization to liquidation as long as there are positive control rents.  On the other hand, if  she 
has to bring in additional equity at time 1 to ward off liquidation - because at start-up, debt was 
structured such that creditors with impaired claims will decide to liquidate without the additional 
equity - she will decide whether or not she will contribute new equity on the basis of a comparison 
between the value that she attributes to control and the value of  the personal wealth that she needs 
to bring in (given that she is rational). 
The entrepreneur has some discretion at time 1 in allocatingX B between the bank's and the 
supplier's claims.  In this manner, the entrepreneur may be able to decide which creditor(s) will be 
involved in the reorganization/liquidation decision once the bad state of  nature realizes.22  This 
might prove valuable if different lenders adopt different liquidation policies for firms that default. 
The bank will base its reorganization/liquidation decision following default against its 
claims on a comparison of  the firm's liquidation value L and going concern value .5X"G, given that it 
2" The fact that we do not discuss control rents at the other nodes in the tree does not imply that they are assumed to be 
zero; it only implies that their value does not affect the results of  our model. 
21  Our results would continue to hold even if we assumed that c"c  =  C'R' 
2' This assumption is not in conflict with priority issues, which arise only in the context of  paying out liquidation 
proceeds (L).  Also, even if suppliers have a legal privilege on the goods they delivered, they have no privilege on the 
cash flows realized from the sale of  these - regardless whether they are processed - goods. 
11 has no implicit equity stake in the firm23  Reputatibn and liability considerations might reinforce 
this decision rule.  If oKG < L, the bank will decide upon liquidation while if t5){  G ~  L, the bank 
will prefer reorganization.  The supplier, on the other hand, considers not only Land t5){  G, but also 
takes into account the additional rents that may be earned on the supply of  new input goods if  the 
film is allowed to reorganize following default.  The present value of future profits that can be 
realized from continued business with the firm represents his implicit equity stake in the firm.  If, 
following reorganization, the good state of  nature realizes at time 2, this implicit equity stake is 
n{G. while the value of  his stake in the bad state is mr  B.  Since the profits that the supplier reaps 
from continued business with the firm presumably are increasing in that firm's performance, we 
assume that mr  G > mr  B, the latter being normalized to zero.24  If  the bank decides to liquidate the 
debtor rather than to reorganize following default against its claims, the supplier cannot prevent this 
from happening: in our model, no side payments are possible between external financiers and the 
supplier cannot take over the bank's claims at time I following the realization of  the bad state of 
nature.  This assumption again might result from reputation and liability considerations on the part 
of  the bank. 
When the creditors of  the defaulted claims allow the firm to reorganize, they effectively 
agree to postpone their impaired claims to make a reorganization possible.  The interest rate that is 
set on these reorganized claims should compensate lenders for the credit risk prevailing at the time 
of reorganization (Rl'b for reorganized bank claims and Rrl for reorganized supplier claims).25 
Below, we summarize the basic structure of  the model and the notation used: 
]J The going concern value calculated by the bank ignores the entrepreneur's control rents.  From the point of  view of 
the entrepreneur. liquidation will therefore be considered as excessive. 
"Our results would continue to hold even if  we assumed that m'u ~  m'H. 
"  The (gross) interest rate on reorganized claims will be set as follows.  Creditors who reorganize their impaired claims 
anticipate that with probability 0, the good state of  nature will realize by time 2 and then a cash flow of  Xc; will be 
available for distribution among them, whereas with probability (1 - 0), the bad state of  nature will realize and then 
there will be no cash left to (partly) redeem them.  The only interest rate that is compatible with this payoff pattern at 
time 2 and zero rents in both credit markets is: II'b  ~  11"  ~  118.  Note that if  at time 2, X G is not sufficiently high to 
(fully) payoff  all lenders who reorganized their claims, then lenders will not be able to break even following 
reorganization. but this might induce them to liquidate rather than to reorganize following default at time I. 
12 EI\TREPRENEUR 
(needs E 1 of external finance) 
......... Ea:  trade credit 
7[i,  0 
(aR' needs to be repaid at time 1) 
E(l - a): bank debt 
«I - a)Rh needs to be repaid at time 1) 




if  reorganized: ~  r 
XB  1 - 0  X B,  m B =  0 
if liquidated: L 
- X: cash flow realized from operational activities, which can be distributed among the external 
financiers that lent money at start-up 
- XG:  cash flow available for distribution at time I in the good state of  nature 
- XB:  cash flow available for distribution at time I in the bad state of nature 
- XG:  cash flow available for distribution at time 2 in the good state of  nature after the firm has 
been reorganized following the realization of  XB at time 1 
-X B: cash flow available for distribution at time 2 in the bad state of  nature after the firm has 
been reorganized following the realization of  XB at time I; X B = 0 
- L: liquidation value of  the firm's assets at time 126 
- a:  fraction of total external finance that is trade credit; 0::; a ::;  I 
- R': price of  trade credit (gross interest rate =  I + interest rate) set at time 0 
- (1 - a): fraction of  total external finance that is bank debt 
- Rb:  price of  bank debt (gross interest rate) set at time 0 
- ff. a stochastic variable that captures the probability that the good state of  nature will realize at 
time I, and which can take only one of  two values:  71:  =  7I:H for high quality entrepreneurs and 71: 
=  7I:L  for low quality entrepreneurs (with 0 < 71:; < 1) 
- a: fraction of  the population of entrepreneurs who are of high quality 
- (J.  the probability that the good state of  nature will realize at time I as perceived/estimated by 
external financiers at start-up 
• If the equilibrium that is modeled is pooling thcn:  () =  a7l:H + (1  - a)7I:L 
• If the equilibrium that is modeled is separating then:  () =  7I:H if  the perceived entrepreneurial 
quality is high and  () =  7I:L if  the perceived entrepreneurial quality is low 
- 0:  the probability that the good state of  nature will realize at time 2 following default and 
reorganization at time I 
- n{a: the implicit equity stake of  the supplier if  the good state of  nature realizes at time 2 
- /11I'B:  the implicit equity stake of the supplier if  the bad state of  nature realizes at time 2;  mrB =  0 
- era:  the value of  the entrepreneur's control rents if  the good state of  nature realizes at time 2 
- el'B: the value of  the entrepreneur's control rents if the bad state of  nature realizes at time 2;  erE =  0 
26 Note that as the cash flow Xu (or Xn) is always fully paid out at time 1 to external financiers and/or the entrepreneur, 
L cannot contain any operating results realized since start-up (e.g., a higher cash position resulting from retained 
earnings). 
13 1/1.  Demand ora Strictlv Constrained Entrepreneur 
In this section, we consider a strictly COliS trained entrepreneur, i.e. an entrepreneur who has 
brought in all her personal wealth as equity at the time of  start-up in order to meet the minimum 
equity contribution for limited liability firms.  The financial structure decision then is reduced to a 
decision on structuring extemal funds (i.e., the proportion of  extemal finance that is bank debt 
versus trade credit).  Following the realization of  the bad state of nature at time 1, such a strictly 
constrained entrepreneur cannot bring in additional equity in order to facilitate a reorganization of 
the defaulted claims.  Therefore, when structuring extemal finance at start-up, the entrepreneur 
might be concemed about the liquidation policy that creditors will adopt following default.  We 
start our discussion by considering the case where XB has been realized and the firm's liquidation 
value exceeds its going concern value, i.e., L > liJ{  G.  The reverse case is discussed thereafter. 
Case I: The Liquidation Value Exceeds the Going Concern Value 
If  the firm's liquidation value exceeds its going concem value, the bank will decide to 
liquidate if  involved in the reorganization/liquidation decision.  If  the bank is fully paid off 
following the realization of  XB at time 1, it will not be involved in that decision.  Therefore, if  at 
start-up, the bank anticipates that, independent of  the state that realizes, it will always be fully paid 
off at time 1, it will charge the risk free rate, independent of  the firm's perceived credit quality 8. 
Then, following the realization of  the bad state of  nature at time 1, default will only occur against 
the supplier, who will decide in favor of  reorganization if his implicit equity stake is large enough. 
As the interest of our model lies here, we assume that the supplier's implicit equity stake indeed 
satisfies a certain boundary condition, which is derived in the following paragraph.  On the other 
hand, if  the bank is not fully paid offfollowing the realization of  XB at time I, it will decide to 
liquidate the firm.  Since the entrepreneur is strictly constrained, she cannot prevent liquidation. 
Neither can the supplier prevent the liquidation since no side payments between the bank and the 
supplier are allowed in our model.  Therefore, depending on their perceived quality 11:j, 
14 entrepreneurs with large benefits from control may have an incentive to structure their debt 
financing such that the defaulted claims will be reorganized following default.  As a result, they 
will choose a combination of  bank debt and trade credit such that default against the bank can 
always be circumvented and such that interest expenses are minimized.  Entrepreneurs who only 
consider the prices of  the different types of credit, on the other hand, will borrow exclusively from 
the bank at start-up to minimize their financing costs.  These insights are formally derived below. 
We first derive the boundary condition for the risk neutral supplier's implicit equity stake 
such that the firm's defaulted claims will be reorganized in the bad state of  nature at time I given 
that the firm has first paid off  the bank loan from the available cash flow XB.  If the supplier decides 
to liquidate, his total payoff equals: 
<~,,~~~:<:,"!:j+minL  ~,~:,::;~.~a)R'  LL  "Ix. -(I-a)R' 1+[ 
1>.1 'he .'·"ppl",· a/ """ 1  1  Ii" .'''pph" 
(I) 
(since Xli + L <  1 and  (1 - ajR'1  + aR'  ~  1) 
If the supplier agrees to reorganize his claim, a new interest rate R"I will be set for the reorganized 
deht so that the supplier is compensated for the new prevailing credit risk, i.e. such that the 
expected payoff, which is 5min{ [aR'  - (X  R  - (1-a)Rh )]R'·I, X"" }+ (1-5)0, is equal to the claim 
that is still outstanding  [aR'  -(XB -(l-a)Rh )].  This results in  R"  = 1/5.  The supplier's total 
expected payoff  under reorganization then equals: 
.  jaR' -[XB -(l-a)R
h
]  ,)'  +mm  ,X ,; 
mn-g"",=,d "f:k emill c/a"" 
(since XII  - L <.:  J,  li\1"r;  <.:  Land (l-a)K + aR' 2: 1) 
The supplier will therefore prefer reorganization to liquidation if:27 
n  By comparing his total payoff under liquidation to his total expected payoff under reorganization, the supplier 
effectively bases his decision on cash flows that are marginal to the decision. 
15 
(2) [.J{ H  - (1- a)Rh J+ 8m"" +  8X'" > [X  B  - (1-a)Rh J+ L 
which is equivalent to 
or  (3) 
In the remainder of  the paper, we assume that the above boundary condition is fulfilled, i.e. that the 
implicit equity stake of  the supplier is sufficiently large so that the supplier will prefer 
reorganization to liquidation following default against his claims. 
The risk averse entrepreneur will choose the debt structure that maximizes her expected 
utility from investing in the project, which can be written as:28 
Jr,  *In{I+[X,; +L-(aR' +(I-a)Rh)]) 
+(I-Jr;)y *In{ 1+[max {XB +L-(aR' +(I-a)Rh ), o}]} 
+ (I-Jr; )(1-y)8 *  In{ 1+[  max {X'  G  [aR' - (XB ~(l- a)R
h
)], o} +c"G ] } 
+(l-Jr;)(I-y)(l-8)*ln{ 1+[0]} 
which can be simplified to: 
where y= I if  the bank is involved in the reorganization/liquidation decision, resulting in the 
(4) 
liquidation ofthe firm.  If  the bank is not involved in the reorganization/liquidation decision, y= O. 
Tn the latter case, the supplier, who has a remaining claim of faR'  - (X  B  - (1-a)Rh)], will choose 
to reorganize following default as his implicit equity stake satisfies boundary condition (3) by 
assumption and charge an (gross) interest rate of 11 8 on his reorganized claim. 
Equation (4) shows that the debt structure that maximizes the entrepreneur's expected utility 
depends upon her intrinsic quality 1[;, which is unobservable by the creditors.  The game that we 
model, is a static game of  complete information.  Therefore, the equilibrium solution of  the model 
is a Nash equilibrium.  If  the equilibrium is separating, then high quality entrepreneurs will borrow 
exclusively from the bank (a =  0) to minimize their cost of external finance while low quality 
"Note that the entrepreneur's expected utility does not depend on the priority structure of  debt.  Therefore, priority 
issues do not affect our analysis. 
16 entrepreneurs will contract only partial bank finance (a > 0).  In the latter case, the fraction of  debt 
financing that is trade credit will be set at a =  (1  -XB), which allows low quality entrepreneurs to 
avoid a potential default against the bank and to minimize their financing cost29, 30 
As a result, the creditors can infer the quality type from the chosen debt structure.  If  an 
entrepreneur contracts no trade credit (a =  0) then, in a separating equilibrium, the bank will infer lr 
=  lrf{ and charge the corresponding bank rate RbH.  For an entrepreneur who contracts only partial 
19 Given the equilibrium price of bank debt, the proportion of ex  tema  I finance demanded as bank debt, (1- a), will be 
set sllch that (I - a)R" = XB.  This strategy makes maximum use of  cheaper bank debt while preventing the bank from 
being involved in the reorganization/liquidation decision: in the bad state at time I, XH is first used to pay off  the bank 
loan and y= O.  Given that the bank faces no credit risk and that the bank credit market is competitive, the bank will set 
Rio = I and, thus, the entrepreneur will choose a = (1  - XB)' 
"  Given that the entrepreneur decides to contract an amount of trade credit finance such that the bank is not involved in 
the reorganization/liquidation decision following the realization of  XR at time I, it seems that she would be indifferent 
between maximum trade credit finance possible (a = I) and minimum trade credit finance possible (a = (I - Xli»  - or 
some intermediate amount of  trade credit finance (i.e., a E]I - Xli,  I [) - in order to still have r= 0: 
filii trade creditfinance (i.e., a =  1):  versus 
The bank, respectively the supplier, will set its 
price for credit to achieve zero expected rents: 
- bank: 110 bank debt is contracted 
- supplier: the expected payoff from the loan, 
eR"'"'' + (I  - 6)(XH + b"X',,), should equal the 
amoullt initially invested, €I 
~  R"'u" = IjB  (l-B)(XB +bX' u) 
B 
\  .... here 8= mr/! + (I - a)JCL if  the equilibrium is pooling 
or  B= m. iflhe equilibrium is separatmg 
total cost of  external finance: 
=€1 * Ri./illi 
=  lie 
(1-13)(.\"" +b"X"u) 
f! 
partial (minimum) trade creditfinance (i.e.,  a =(1 -XBJ) 
The bank, respectively the supplier, will set its price for 
credit to achieve zero expected rents: 
- bank: the expected payoff  from the loan,  BXBRb, pamal 
+ (I - BJXBRb, pa"ial, should equal the amount initially 
invested, €"YB 
=> Rb, pOI'oaf = 1 
- supplier: the expected payoff from the loan, 
~I  _XB)R"pa,ual + (I - 6)i5X'G, should equal the 
amount initially invested, €(1  - XB) 
=::>  R"pamal = lje  (l-e)b"X"G 
e(l-XH) 
where  B= an" + (1- a)7fI. if  the equilibrium is pooling 
or 8= ff!  ..  if  the equilibrium is separating 
total cost of  external finance: 
=  €XB *  Rh, parlinl + €(]  ~  X/J) *  R/' par//QI 




However, the supplier can set only one price for trade credit finance.  The eventual price that the supplier sets will 
equalize his expected marginal revenue to his marginal cost.  Therefore, the price of  trade credit will be a "weighted 
average" of  the different prices  I/B  (l-B)kXB -(I-a»+c2Y'(,], each corresponding to an a  E  [1  -XB' I], where each 
(;b 
price is set to make the supplier earning zero rents on his lending activities, given that a particular a has been chosen. 
The weights used will be determined by the likelihood that each a from the interval [I -XH' I] will be chosen. 
However. a supplier that would set this average price would disproportionately attract entrepreneurs who choose to set 
a = (! - XII) (with R" =  I), and who would only have to pay the "average" trade credit price rather than the higher trade 
credit price  I/e _  (I - 8 )OX ' ,;  Note that the process that we describe here is another example of adverse selection. 
8(1 - X  R) 
Hence, the only price oftrade credit that is sustainable with equilibrium is  I/e _ (I  - e  )ox 'u  .  Then, for 
8(1-X8) 
17 bank finance (a > 0), both creditors will infer 7r =  7rL and charge the corresponding bank rate RbL 
and supplier rate R'L  In Appendix 1, we derive the value of  the separating quality level 7r*.  If  7rL 
lies in the interval [0,  7r*[  and 7rH lies in the interval]7r*, 1], where 
*_  In{l+c''c;Y 
7r  - In{ 1 + Xc; +L- RhH }-In{ 1+X" +L -XB -(l-XB)R,L}+ In{ 1 +e'(i Y  , 
RhH  =  Ij7rH  (1-7rff )(XR +L) 
7rH 
Rh!,  =  1  and R'L  =  117r  _ (1-7r  dSX'G 
,  L  7rL(1-XS) ' 
it is optimal for the low quality entrepreneur to contract partial bank finance (a > 0) with the 
amount of  bank debt equal to Xs and the amount of  trade credit equal to (1 - Xs), while for the high 
quality entrepreneur, it is optimal to borrow exclusively from the bank (a = 0). 
The results from Appendix 1 can be interpreted as follows.  Since bank debt is cheaper than 
trade credit,31  a high quality entrepreneur will prefer to borrow exclusively from the bank if  the 
lower interest expenses under the good state of  nature at time 1 more than offset the loss of  control 
rents under the bad state of  nature at time 1.  Entrepreneurs will put more weight on the 
minimization of  financing expenses as the likelihood that the good state of  nature will realize at 
time 1 increases, ceteris paribus.  For a low quality entrepreneur, however, the stricter enforcement 
of liquidation rights by the bank may dominate the lower price of  bank debt.  When the value of 
control rents (e'e) is large, the loss of  these control rents following default at time 1 when 
borrowing exclusively from the bank is no longer compensated by the lower interest rate Rb 
In Appendix 2, we compute the first order derivatives of Jr* with respect to each of  the 
parameters of  the model.  Our main results are the following: (1) o7r*IORbH > °  and o7r*loR'L < 0, 
enlrepreneurs who prefer toavoid the bank from being involved in the reorganization/liquidation decision, it is optimal 
to choose a =  (I - X,,). 
"  Initially, bank debt is cheaper because the bank will liquidate the firm following the realization of  Xli ifnot fully paid 
off.  Then. L is the cash flow from the reorganization/liquidation decision,  On the other hand, if  the bank is fully paid 
off. the supplier will, given his  implicit equity stake, allow the firm to reorganize.  Then, oJ{G is the expected cash flow 
from the reorganization/liquidation decision.  Since oX'" < L and both credit markets are competitive, borrowing 
exclusively from the bank will entail lower financing expenses than borrowing exclusively from the supplier.  If  the 
resulting equilibrium is separating, borrowing exclusively from the bank will even become cheaper as then banks know 
that only high quality entrepreneurs will prefer to borrow exclusively from the bank. 
18 which implies that when the price of  bank debt falls (or the price of trade credit increases), the 
separating 1[* falls as the advantage of  the supplier's lenient liquidation policy has become smaller. 
An increase in the cash flow X G only reduces the price of  trade credit and, therefore, reduces the 
drawback associated with partial bank and trade credit financing, i.e., 81[*18X  G > O.  (2) 8Jr*18c'c > 
°  and 81[*/00> 0, which implies that higher control rents raise the value of  being allowed to 
reorganize following default.  Hence, the separating 1[* increases, ceteris paribus.  (3) 8Jr*18Xc > 0, 
which at first may seem counterintuitive since it could be argued that higher cash flows in the good 
state increase the weight that entrepreneurs put on this state.  However, because of  risk aversion, 
lower financing expenses in the good state when borrowing exclusively from the bank may no 
longer weigh against the loss of  control rents in the bad state.  (3) 81[*18XB> 0, which again can be 
explained by the reduced price of  external financing and entrepreneurial risk aversion. 
We have a pooling equilibrium if both 1[H and 1[L are located in the same interval.  If  1[H and 
1[L  E  [0, 1[*[, the equilibrium will be pooling at partial bank finance (a> 0) with the amount of bank 
debt equal to XB and the amount of  trade credit equal to (1 - XB).  The bank and the supplier charge 
the following prices for credit: 
RhO  = I, and 
(l-8)oX'G 
8 
with 8 =  a1[H + (1  - a)1[L and a = the proportion of  high quality entrepreneurs. 
If 1[H and n:L  E  ]n:*,  1], the equilibrium will be pooling at full bank finance (a  =  0), and the 
bank charges the following price for credit: 
Rh&  = 1/8-(1-8)(X8 +L). 
8 
In the above described pooling equilibria, high quality entrepreneurs may resort to signaling to 
reveal their higher quality to the bank.  If the equilibrium is pooling at full bank finance, signaling 
cannot occur through the amount of equity brought in at start-up, given that entrepreneurs are 
19 strictly constrained.  Other mechanisms, which have been discussed extensively in the literature 
(e.g., collateral in Bester (1987), the percentage of  equity retained in Leland and Pyle (1977), etc.) 
might play an important role, but these are beyond the scope of  our paper.  Therefore, in our model, 
when the equilibrium is pooling at full bank finance, there is no way for high quality strictly 
constrained entrepreneurs to reveal their higher quality.  Next, if  the eqUilibrium is pooling at 
partial bank finance, high quality strictly constrained entrepreneurs have no incentive to signal their 
higher quality: tl1e bank already charges the lowest possible rate (RhO = 1), and suppliers are 
prohibited by law from practicing price discrimination on their trade credit. 
Case 2:  the Going Concern Value Exceeds the Liquidation Value 
If  the finn's going concern value exceeds its liquidation value ((i){  G? L), entrepreneurs are 
indifferent between bank debt and trade credit: both fue bank and fue supplier will decide to 
reorganize following the realization of  the bad state of  nature at time 1 and, fuus, the fraction of 
external [mance that is bank debt cannot be used to signal quality.  Also, since entrepreneurs have 
limited personal wealth, they cannot use their equity contribution at start-up to signal their quality. 
Then, the price of  bank debt and trade credit will be identical and the equilibrium will be pooling. 
This case is discussed in detail in Appendix 3. 
IV. Demand ora Weakly Constrained Entrepreneur 
111 this section, we consider a weakly constrained entrepreneur, i.e. an entrepreneur whose 
personal wealth exceeds the minimum equity contribution for limited liability firms, but is 
insufficient to finance all input goods.  In addition to setting the fraction of  bank debt versus trade 
credit, this entrepreneur must also decide how much equity to contribute beyond the legal 
minimum.  The amount of  external finance that must be contracted at start-up then is equal to € (1 -
additional equity contributed beyond the legal minimum).  A weakly constrained entrepreneur who 
anticipates that she can bring in additional equity in the bad state of  nature at time 1 in order to 
20 facilitate a reorganization, might decide to contract more bank debt (than Xs) at start-up in order to 
lower financing expenses while maintaining the advantage that her firm will not be liquidated once 
the bad state of  nature realizes.  Again, we start our discussion by considering the case where Xs 
has been realized and the firm's liquidation value exceeds its going concern value, i.e., L;:: X G. 
Case 1:  The Liquidation Value Exceeds the Going Concern Value 
To demonstrate the special role of the supplier's implicit equity stake, we continue to 
assume that the boundary condition (3) is satisfied, i.e., nl  G > (L - 5Xc)/5.  Therefore, whether the 
firm will be reorganized or liquidated given that its liquidation value exceeds its going concern 
value, depends on whether the bank is involved in that decision. 
A weakly constrained entrepreneur who contracts an amount of  bank debt equal to Xs + W > 
XB at start-up might be able to ward offliquidation at time 1 by contributing additional equity in the 
bad state.  If  the bank anticipates that its claim will always be fully paid off at time 1, it will still 
charge the risk free rate to the entrepreneur at start-up.  Then, the amount of equity that the 
entrepreneur needs to bring in to prevent liquidation at time 1 equals w, which is exactly the 
amount of  bank debt over and aboveX B that the entrepreneur contracted at start-up.  Whether or not 
additional equity will actually be contributed, depends on two factors: (1) whether liquidation can 
be prevented, and (2) whether control rents are sufficiently large.  In the following paragraph, we 
argue that the upper boundary for the amount of equity w that a weakly constrained entrepreneur 
can credibly promise - because it is in her self-interest - to contribute in the bad state is: 
min {W,  8::'"G - ;{j, 
where W is the amount of  personal wealth left at stali-up if the entrepreneur contributes only the 
legally required minimum (W < I by assumption), and A is the risk premium that makes a risk 
averse entrepreneur indifferent between a certain value of (&r  G - A) and an expected value of  (&r  G 
+ (1  - 6)0).  ;{ can be calculated as follows: 
21 or A =  I + &r(; - (1 + c"(;)" 
Our result that w will not be set at a value greater than min {U~ Se'  G -:t}  follows from the fact that 
the entrepreneur wi 11  only contribute additional equity in the bad state at time 1 if  the utility derived 
from preserving control rents is larger than the utility derived from the amount of  personal wealth 
that she must give up.  If W> Se'  G - A, then the upper boundary for w is (Se'  G -:t) because ifthe 
entrepreneur would set a greater w'then, in the bad state, she would need to give up w 'to prevent 
liquidation while she would receive only Se'  G in expected value, the latter being equivalent to a 
certain (Sere - },).  Therefore, once the bad state realizes, she would never give up w'  and her firm 
would be liquidated.  On the other hand, if W < Sere - :t, then the upper boundary for w is  W 
because if  the entrepreneur would set a greater w"then, in the bad state, she would only be able to 
bring in W.  However, she would never give up  W to receive nothing in return as she would not be 
able to prevent liquidation by bringing in all her remaining wealth W. 
In Appendix 4, we show that if  creditors anticipate that an entrepreneur who contracted (XB 
+ w) of bank debt will not bring in w in the bad state - because w> min{W, IX/e -:t}  - it is in the 
entrepreneur's best interest to contract only XB rather than (XB + w) of  bank debt.  This results from 
the fact that external financiers will not lower their price of credit, as the entrepreneur is not giving 
a credible quality signal, and following default, the firm will be liquidated.  On the other hand, by 
contracting (Xs + w) of  bank debt at start-up with w:::; min {W,  Se'  G - :t}, there is no doubt that the 
entrepreneur can and will contribute w in the bad state and the firm will be reorganized. 
Tn  the discussion that follows, we distinguish two situations, depending on whether or not 
an entrepreneur who borrows exclusively from the bank at start-up will ward off liquidation by 
contributing new equity once the bad state realizes.  We first consider the case where min (W,  Se' e-
:t) < (I - X B), and thus her firm will be liquidated in the bad state.  This will be the case for 
entrepreneurs with limited personal wealth.  Next, we consider the case where min {W,  Sere -:t}  2: 
22 (1  - Xs).  In this last case, even an entrepreneur who borrows exclusively from the bank is able to -
and will - ward offliquidation in the bad state. 
Case l.a. min rw,  &;'  G - Ai < 1 -XB 
We start by assuming that weakly constrained entrepreneurs only bring in the minimum 
equity contribution required by law.  Below, we show that both high and low quality entrepreneurs 
will not deviate from this assumption, given that the equilibrium is separating.  On the other hand, 
if  the equilibrium is pooling, a high quality weakly constrained entrepreneur might use her equity 
contribution to force the equilibrium to become separating. 
If a weakly constrained entrepreneur borrows exclusively from the bank (a = 0), then, 
following default, she needs to bring in (1  - Xs), which she either is not able to bring in (e.g., if W < 
I - XB < &;'  G - A) or chooses to forego (e.g., if W> 1 - XB > &;'  G - A).  As a consequence, this 
entrepreneur will never bring in some additional equity in thc bad state at time 1.  Rational banks 
will sct the price of  bank debt accordingly: given that the entrepreneur only brings in minimum 
.  b  .  (l-B)(X  +L)  32 
eqUIty at start-up, R  wIll be set at 1/ B _  B. 
B 
If a weakly constrained entrepreneur contracts partial bank finance (a > 0) with the amount 
of  bank debt equal to (Xs + w), the amount of  trade credit equal to (I -Xs  - w) and w:::; min{W, 
&;'  G - A  J, she knows that she can and will ward off liquidation by the bank in the bad state of 
nature by bringing in an amount w as new equity: she knows that the supplier will prefer 
reorganization and that side payments from the supplier to the bank cannot occur.  Contracting 
more bank debt than Xs allows her to finance a larger fraction of  debt at the lower bank rate Rh =  1. 
When min {W,  &;'  G - A} < (1-Xs), we find that the separating equilibrium of  the previous section, 
where high quality entrepreneurs borrow exclusively from the bank (a = 0) and low quality 
"where e=  arrH + (1  - a)rrJ. if the equilibrium is pooling at full bank finance and e=  7[11  ifthe equilibrium is 
separating with high (low) quality entrepreneurs contracting full (partial) bank finance.  For the equilibrium to be 
23 entrepreneurs contract partial bank finance (a> 0), is preserved when the entrepreneur is no longer 
strictly constrained.  When 7rL  lies in the interval [0,  7r*[ and 7rH lies in the interval]1Z"*,  I], where 
1Z"*=  In{l+c"u+WY-ln{I+W}" 
[
In{ I+X" +L_Rhlf +W}+ln{ I+c'"c; +WY  ]' 
-In{l+X,; +L-XB -(I-Xn)R'1. +W}-ln{ I+WY 
(l-7r  L)8X'  c; 
1Z"1.(I-XB )  , 
it is optimal for the low quality entrepreneur to contract partial bank finance (a > 0) with the 
amount of bank debt equal to XB and the amount of  trade credit equal to (1 - XB), while for the high 
quality entrepreneur, it is optimal to borrow exclusively from the bank (a = 0).  The above derived 
separating condition on entrepreneurial quality, 7r*, is decreasing in W (i.e., 87r*!8W < 0), which 
indicates that wealthier entrepreneurs are more likely to borrow exclusively from the bank at start-
up, ceteris paribus.  The sign of  the other derivatives remains the same as discussed in the previous 
model (see Appendix 2). 
In this separating equilibrium, neither high nor low quality entrepreneurs have an incentive 
to contribute more equity at start-up than the legal minimum because of  risk aversion.  In addition, 
low quality entrepreneurs have no incentive to contract more bank debt thanXB.  Proofs of  these 
propositions are given in Appendix 5. 
We have a pooling equilibrium if  both 7rH and 7rL are located in the same interval.  Ifboth 7rH 
and  1Z"L  lie below 1Z"*,  the equilibrium is pooling at partial bank finance while if both 1Z"H and 7rL lie 
above 1Z"*,  the equilibrium is pooling at full bank finance.  In a pooling equilibrium, high quality 
entrepreneurs may have an incentive to dissociate themselves from low quality ones to lower their 
interest expenses.  Then, two new separating equilibria result, which are discussed sUbsequently. 
pooling at full bank finance, both  ;r/. and ;rH should be in the same interval];r*, 1], where the cutoff  value ;r* is 
determined below. 
24 If  both lrf/ and lrL lie below the separating condition lr*, then a high quality weakly 
constrained entrepreneur might have an incentive to contract more bank debt at start-up to lower 
ilnancing expenses.  Interest expenses can be lowered by increasing the fraction of external finance 
that is bank debt since Rb = 1 is lower than the trade credit rate R'.  However, the lower financing 
rate comes at a cost of  having to give up w if  the bad state of  nature realizes.  In the resulting 
separating equilibrium, we find that when lrL lies in the interval [0,  lr*'  [ and lrf/ lies in the interval 
Jlr*~ lJ, where 
lr*' 
In{ I+c'c; +wy -In\I+c'  G +W-wY +lnll+W}(I-J) -lnll+W-w)<h» 
Iln{ 1  + XI; + L - X B -(1-X B  _w)R,e.new + W - 11')+ In{ 1  +&;'r; + W)+ Inll + W}(l-O)  J' 
l-In{ 1  + X,; + L -XR -(1-XIl)R,e.new + W)-In{ 1  + &;"u + W - w)-Inll + W - wjP-O) 
R hH  =  I,  R hI.  = I , 
R,e.n,w  _ (1- X B) - aw-(1-B)"X'  G  33 
- [B(I-XR)-alrHw]  , 
it is optimal for the low quality entrepreneur to contract partial bank finance (a > 0) with the 
amount of  bank debt equal to XB and the amount of  trade credit equal to (1 - XB), while for the high 
quality entrepreneur, it is optimal to contract partial bank finance (a > 0) with the amount of  trade 
credit equal to (1 - XB - w).  Moreover, high quality entrepreneurs might be indifferent between 
contracting € (XB + w) of  bank debt and then contributing w once the bad state realizes on the one 
hand, and contracting € XB of  bank debt and contributing £ (the legal  minimum +  11') in equity at 
start-up on the other hand34 
33  If there is  no doubt that high quality entrepreneurs will bring in w in the bad state, the supplier will revise his price 
for trade credit R,e ne"  downwards so that no rents are earned in the trade credit market as follows: 
a( 1 -X,,- 11') + (I - a)(1 -XII) ~ a[J7'H(1  -XH - w)R'·· '''". + (I - 7rH)5X'ol + (I - a)[7rI.(1  _XII)R'o. ,,,'" + (1  - 7rL)5X'G] 
mean al1101lnl invested  expected payoff/or the sup;lier  from providing trade credit 
by the supplier 
(1  -Xli) - a11'  ~ [(aJZ'H'"  (1  - a)JZ'L)(1 -XB) - aJZ'Hw]R,e "",. + [aCI  - JZ'H) + (1  - a)(l - JZ'L)]5X'G 
(1  -X/J) - a11'  ~  [61:1  -XII) - aJZ'"w]R,e m'''' + (1  - 0ox'c; 
I?,I).,,,.,, = (1- X H )-a11'-(1-8)£5X"" 
[II(1-X8 )-a7r,,11'] 
'" In case 11' is brought in as additional equity at start-up, the condition w:'>min(W,  &"0 - J.) is no longer needed 
because no additional equity has to be contributed in the bad state at time 1 to ward off liquidation; then, w is only 
bounded by  W.  i.e., 11' S W.  This will prove valuable if the utility attributed to control rents is lower than the utility 
attributed to remaining personal wealth W; then, min{w' 5c'u - J.}  =  (5c"G - A).  Therefore, ifthe optimal w, i.e., the 
25 As entrepreneurs are risk averse, the high quality weakly constrained entrepreneur will 
choose the smallest w that allows dissociation from low quality entrepreneurs.  Then, w is set 
according to the following equality: 
"/I In{I+Xu +L-(X" +W)-(l-XB _w)R,B.n,", +W} 
+ (1-"  H  )b"ln{ 1  +c'u + W - w}+ (l-"H )(l-b")ln{ 1+  W - w} 
== "H In{ l+X(; +L-Xn -(1-XB)R'B,n,w +W} 
+ (l-"H )b"ln{ I +Cl'r;  + W}+ (l-"H )(I-b")ln{ 1+ W} 
If  there is no solution for w that satisfies the constraint w ~  min {W,  &/'  G - It} (or w ~  W - see 
footnote 34) given that both "H and "L lie below ;rr*, the equilibrium can only be pooling at partial 
bank finance.  Then, both low and high quality entrepreneurs set the amount of  bank debt equal to 
XB, the amount of  trade credit equal to (1 - XB) and no entrepreneur has an incentive to bring in 
more equity than the legal minimum, 
If  both "H and "L lie above the separating condition ,,*, then a high quality weakly 
constrained entrepreneur might have an incentive to bring in more equity at start-up and thus 
demand less external (bank) finance to obtain a lower price for bank debt, which results from 
signaling here.  In the resulting separating equilibrium, we find that that when "L lies in the interval 
[0, ,,*"[ and "H lies in the interval];rr*'~ 1], where 
,,*"_  In{l+W}-ln{I+W-w} 
- [In{I+Xu +L-(l-w)RhH  +W -w}+ln{ I+W}]' 
-In{l+ Xc;  +L_RhL + W}-ln{ 1+ W -wi 
"/. 
(l-"H)(Xn +L) 
"H (1- w) 
(if (I - 1\') > XB + L)  or  RhH  == 1  (if(l-w)SXirIL) 
minimum w that makes the separating condition work, exceeds (&;r" - it), but is smaller than W, a separating 
equilibrium is only attainable when high quality entrepreneurs contract partial bank finance with the amount of  bank 
debt equal to X", the amount of  trade credit equal to (I - XB - w) and bring in w as additional equity at start-up.  In all 
other cases, the weakly constrained entrepreneur will be indifferent between bringing in more equity at start-up versus 
credibly promising to bring it in once the bad state of  nature realizes. 
26 it is optimal for the low quality entrepreneur to contribute only the legal minimum equity and to 
contract € I of  bank financing while for the high quality entrepreneur, it is optimal to bring in w in 
addition to minimum equity and to contract € (1 - w) of  bank financing at start-up." 
As entrepreneurs are risk averse, the high quality weakly constrained entrepreneur will 
choose the smallest w that allows dissociation from low quality entrepreneurs.  Then, W  set 
according to  the following equality: 
7fH  In{ I+X(j +L-Rhl + W}+(I-7fH)ln{ 1+ W} 
=  7fH  In{ I+X" +L-(l-w)RhH +(W -w)}+(I-7fH )ln{ I+W -wi 
If there is no solution for w that satisfies the constraint w ::;  W given that both 7fH and 7fL lie above 
7f*,  the equilibrium can only be pooling where both low and high quality entrepreneurs borrow 
exclusively from the bank and bring in only the legal minimum of equity. 
We can summarize our discussion by the following figure: 
o  ;r*  7[*" 
First, note that 7f*'< 7f*.  This implies that if  both high and low quality weakly constrained 
entrepreneurs find it too costly to borrow exclusively from the bank at start-up - because their firm 
will be liquidated for sure following default, i.e., 7fL  <  7f* and 7f1l <  7f* - then high quality 
entrepreneurs may still find it affordable to dissociate themselves from lower quality ones by 
contracting more bank debt than XB at start-up, knowing that they will have to bring in additional 
equity in the bad state of  nature at time 1, or by bringing in more equity at start-up.  This will be the 
case if  7fL  < 7f*'  <  7fH <  7f*.  Entrepreneurs for whom control rents only have limited value and who 
would like to reveal their higher quality will prefer to bring in more equity at start-up, ceteris 
paribus. 
Second, note that 7f*"> 7f*.  This implies that if  both high and low quality weakly 
constrained entrepreneurs find it optimal to borrow exclusively from the bank at start-up, i.e., 7fL> 
J5  Note that the condition w smin{W, &"" - l} is no  longer needed here as the decision of bringing in more equity (w) 
27 7r* and 7rH> 7r*, then high quality entrepreneurs may still find it affordable to dissociate themselves 
from lower quality ones by bringing in more equity than the legal minimum at start-up.  This will 
be the case if  7r* < 7[L < 7[*"  < 7[H. 
Case l.h. min{W. &:rc - Ai> l-Xe 
If  a weakly constrained entrepreneur borrows the € 1 needed exclusively from the bank, 
then, given that min fW,  &:r  G - Aj 2:  1 - Xe, she is able to and will fully pay off the bank in the bad 
state at time 1 as only (1 - Xe) is needed to prevent liquidation by the bank.  The only price for 
bank debt that is compatible with zero expected rents in the bank credit market is the risk free rate 
(R b =  1) as the bank can anticipate that, independent of  the perceived firm's credit quality e, it faces 
no credit risk.  As a result, a weakly constrained entrepreneur who borrows exclusively from the 
bank is indifferent between bringing in minimum equity and contracting € 1 of  bank finance on the 
one hand, and bringing in € (legal minimum + w) in equity (with 0:::; w:::; W)  and contracting € (1 -
w) bank debt on the other hand, even when risk averse.  36 
If a wealdy constrained entrepreneur contracts partial bank finance with the amount of  bank 
debt equal to (X8 + w), the amount of  trade credit equal to (1 - Xe - w) and w :::; min tw.  &:r  G - A}, 
then, once the bad state realizes, the bank will again be fully paid off.  Therefore, independent of 
than the minimum required by law is made (and carried out) at the time of  start-up. 
30 Given that the entrepreneur borrows exclusively from the bank, she is indifferent between the following alternatives: 
•  minimum equity finance and €I of  bank debt 
", In!1 + p;, + L-I  +  W},' + (1- "Joln(1 + [e'a +Xa + w- (I-X,v}) + (I-JrJO-1i) In(l + [W- (I-X.!}) 
•  maximum equity finance (11' + minimum equity contribution) and €(l- W) of  bank debt, given that W < I 
;r; In!  I + p'" + L - (1- "'oj  + O)} + (1- "J/jln,'l + [c'" + X" + 0 + (.,<,,- (1- Wi)}) + (1- trJ(I-1i) In {I + rn + (x" - (1- Wi)}} 
•  some intermediate amount of  equity (11' + minimum equity contribution) and E(I - w) of  bank debt, with 0 < w < W 
ifl-w5)(H: 
Jr, In!1  + p'" + 1.-11-11') +  (IV-wJ}} + (1- JrJOln{1  + [c'" +X,,+ (W-,,~ + (X,,- (I -wJ)}} 
+ (1- trJ(I- b) In{1 + [(W-w) + (-'<,,- (I -w))}} 
if'l-w;CX,,: 
Jr, In!1 + p'" + I. - (/ -11') + (W-wJ}} + (1- "Joln{1 + [e'" +x"  + (W-w)- ((I-w)-X,,))} 
+ (1- "J(I-Ii) In (I + [(W-w)-((I-w)-X")}J 
It  is clear that once the entrepreneur has decided to borrow exclusively from the bank and min{W, &!o -).}  ;C 1 - XB, 
she is indifFerent between a financial structure that consists of  more (less) equity (and thus less (more) bank debt), even 
if she is risk averse.  As the bank anticipates that it will always be fully paid off at time I, it charges the risk free rate to 
entrepreneurs who borrow exclusively from the bank.  Then, the entrepreneur always receives the same payoff in each 
state that realizes at time  I and financial structure (i.e., the fraction of  total finance that is debt versus equity) becomes 
irrelevant. 
28 the finn's perceived credit quality e, the bank also charges the risk free rate (R b =  1) to 
entrepreneurs who borrow only partially from the bank at start-up.  However, the entrepreneur 
cannot credibly commit to the supplier that she will bring in additional equity in the bad state to 
(partially) pay off  the trade credit since the implicit equity stake of  the supplier ensures that he will 
decide in favor of reorganization with or without some additional equity from the entrepreneur. 
Therefore, when setting his price for trade credit, the supplier will presume that entrepreneurs will 
never bring in additional equity in the bad state to reduce his claim. 
The separating equilibrium of  the previous section, where high quality entrepreneurs borrow 
exclusively from the bank (a = 0) and low quality entrepreneurs apply for partial bank finance (a > 
0), is preserved when the entrepreneur is no longer strictly constrained given that min (W,  Je'-G - A) 
~  (I -XB).  We find that when trL  lies in the interval [0, tr*[ and trH lies in the interval]tr*, 1], 
where 
tr* =  In{ l+e'·u +wy -In{ e'G +X'G +W +XBY -In{ W +XB)(J-oJ +In{ I+WjP-oJ 
[
Inl  X,; +L+W)-ln{l+XG +L-XB -(l-XB)R,L +W}+ln{ l+W)(J-OJ]  , 
+In{ l+e'c; +WY -In{ c'  G +X'" +W +XB }" -In{ W +XB)(hl") 
RhH  =1, 
Rhl.  = 1,  R,I.  = l/tr  _ (l-trIJJX'  " 
L  tr  I (1-X B)  , 
it is optimal for the low quality entrepreneur to contract partial bank finance (a> 0) with the 
amount of  bank debt equal to XB and the amount of  trade credit equal to (1 - XB), while for the high 
quality entrepreneur, it is optimal to borrow exclusively from the bank (a  =  0), but the fraction of 
total finance that is (bank) debt versus equity is - see footnote 36 - indeterminate when min {W, 
Jere - Ai ~  (1 -Xs). 
In this separating equilibrium, low quality entrepreneurs have no incentive to demand more 
bank debt thanXB nor to contribute more equity than the legal minimum because of  risk aversion. 
The proofs of  these propositions follow the same logic as in Appendix 5.  For high quality 
29 entrepreneurs who borrow exclusively from the bank, financial structure (i.e., the fraction oftotal 
finance that is debt versus equity) becomes irrelevant when min {W,  &r  G - A} ;e:  (1  - XB). 
On the other hand, if  the equilibrium is pooling at partial bank finance (when both 7TH and 7TL 
lie below 7T*)  or pooling at full bank finance (when both 7TH and TTL  lie above 7T*), high quality 
entrepreneurs may have an incentive to dissociate themselves from low quality entrepreneurs to 
lower their cost of financing.  These two cases are discussed subsequently. 
Ifboth 7TH and TTL  lie below the separating condition tr*, then a high quality weakly 
constrained entrepreneur might have an incentive to contract more bank debt than XB and/or to 
bring in more equity at start-up to dissociate herself from low quality entrepreneurs once she is no 
longer strictly constrained.37.38  In the resulting separating equilibrium, we find that when TTL  lies in 
the interval [0,  7T*'[ and 7TH lies in the interval ]7T*~ 1], where 
tr*'=  In{ l+crc; +W}" -In{ l+c'"" +W -wt  +In( l+Wj<l-§) -In( I+W  _w}(1-o)  , 
[In{ I +  Xc; +L-Xn -(l-X8 _w)R,o,new +W  -w}+ln{ l+&r" +W}+ln( l+W}(1-o)  ] 
-In{ I+X" +L-XB -(l-X,JR,O,new +W}-ln{ 1+&'  G +W  -w}-ln( I+W  _w}(1-O) 
RIO.lll·\!  (1- X H) -aw-(1-B)8X"G 
[B(1- X B) - a7r  H  w] 
it is optimal for the low quality entrepreneur to contract partial bank finance (a > 0) with the 
amount of  bank debt equal to XB and the amount of  trade credit equal to (1 - XB), while for the high 
37 Here, high quality entrepreneurs who have an incentive to dissociate themselves from low quality entrepreneurs are 
/ola"y indifferent between contracting partial bank finance with (X8 + w) of bank debt, (l - XH - w) of  trade credit and 
bringing in minimum equity on the one hand and contracting partial bank finance withX B of  bank debt, (l-XB - w) of 
trade credit and bringing in  11' as additional equity beyond the minimum on the other hand.  This results from min {w, 
t5c"r; - Ai ~  (I - )(R). 
38 A specific feature of  the model where min{w. lX/a - J..) ~  (l-X~  is that when the entrepreneur decides to contract 
partial bank finance with (X" + 11') of  bank debt and (1  - XB - w) of  trade credit and chooses to set a w different from 
zero, the maximum possible value for 11' - given that the entrepreneur needs only €! of  additional finance beyond the 
legal minimum equity - that she can set is w = (1 - XB).  This situation is identical to the one where she decides to 
borrow exclusively from the bank.  Then, the separating equilibrium of  the previous section where a low quality 
entrepreneur contracts X" of  bank debt and (1  - XB) of  trade credit and a high quality entrepreneur contracts (X8 + w) of 
bank debt and (1  - X" - 11') of  trade credit coincides with the separating equilibrium where a low quality entrepreneur 
contracts XR of  bank debt and (1  - XR) of  trade credit and a high quality entrepreneur borrows exclusively from the 
bank. 
30 quality entrepreneur, it is optimal to contract partial bank finance (a > 0) with the amount oftrade 
credit equal to (I - Xs - w).  Moreover, high quality entrepreneurs are indifferent between 
contracting (X8 + w) of  bank debt at start-up and then bringing in 11' in the bad state on the one 
hand, and contracting Xs of  bank debt and contributing € (legal minimum + 11') in equity at start-up 
on the other hand. 
As entrepreneurs are risk averse, the high quality weakly constrained entrepreneur will 
choose the smallest w that allows dissociation from low quality entrepreneurs.  Then, w is set 
according to the following equality: 
JrH  In{ I+Xc +L-(Xs +w)-(l-Xs _w)R,B.new +W} 
+ (l-JrH )Sln{ 1 + &rc + W -11'}+ (l-JrH )(I-S)lnl1 + W - w) 
~Jrrr In{I+Xc +L-Xs _(l_Xs)R,B,new +W} 
+(l-JrH)Sln{I+&rc +W}+(1-Jrrr )(1-S)lnl 1+ W) 
If  there is no solution for w that satisfies the constraint w::; W given that both Jrj{ and  JrL  lie below 
Jr*, the equilibrium can only be pooling at partial bank finance.  Then, both low and high quality 
entrepreneurs set the amount of  bank debt equal to Xs, the amount of  trade credit equal to (l-Xs) 
and no entrepreneur has an incentive to contribute more equity than the legal minimum. 
If both Jrrr and  ffL  lie above the separating condition  ff*,  then a high quality weakly 
constrained entrepreneur can no longer dissociate herself from low quality entrepreneurs by 
bringing in more equity at start-up (and, thus, demanding less external (bank) finance) given that 
]))J1J{W,  &rc - A):?: (1  -Xs).  We have shown above - see footnote 36 - that financial structure is 
totally ilTelevant for wealthy entrepreneurs with large control rents who borrow exclusively from 
the bank. 
Case 2: The Going Concern Value Exceeds the Liquidation Value 
If the finn's going concern value exceeds its liquidation value (SXc :?: L), both the bank and 
the supplier will decide to reorganize following the realization of the bad state of  nature.  If  a high 
31 quality weakly constrained entrepreneur has no incentive to signal her higher quality by bringing in 
more equity at start-up, the equilibrium modeled will be pooling.  On the contrary, if  she brings in 
more equity at start-up, the equilibrium might become separating.  As only the bank adjusts its 
credit rate to perceived credit quality, a high quality entrepreneur who has an incentive to bring in 
more equity at start-up, will borrow exclusively from the bank to minimize her cost of finance.  In 
the resulting equilibrium, rational suppliers anticipate that henceforth only low quality 
entrepreneurs still apply for trade credit and therefore, the equilibrium price of  trade credit will be 
adjusted upwards in order for the supplier to still break even on his lending.  Then, a low quality 
entrepreneur becomes indifferent between borrowing exclusively from the bank, borrowing 
exclusively from the supplier or some combination of  bank debt and trade credit.  This case is 
discussed in detail in Appendix 6. 
V.  Empirical Evidence 
In this section, we investigate whether the above developed theoretical model is empirically 
supported using data on 152 true start-ups in Belgian manufacturing, all founded in 1992.  Since 
limited liability firms have to file their annual accounts with the Belgian National Bank, we were 
able to collect the financial statements of these start-ups and their industry counterparts.  Also, 
start-ups are legally obliged to publish an abstract from their foundation charter, which contains 
details on ownership structure.  Table I gives information on the industry distribution of the sample 
firms, based on their two-digit NACE code.  In Table II, we provide summary statistics on the start-
ups included in our sample.  First, we observe that these finns are rather small at the time of start-
up: the average finn employs 2.70 persons (median of one), whereas its total resources amount to 
€ 198262  in the start-up year.  Since total assets is less than total resources, it can be inferred that 
the average firm incurs (accounting) losses during the start-up year.  Next, the start-ups are highly 
levered; on average, 68.97% of  initial resources is raised as external debt financing.  The median 
even points to a higher share of external debt as a source of  capital.  Bank debt represents only 
32 30.78% of total external debt in the average firm.  The maturity structure of debt indicates that 
68.64% of total external debt has a maturity not exceeding one year in the start-up year.  When 
considering bank debt only, short-term bank debt on average represents 26.64% of  total bank debt. 
Finally, we observe that initial ownership is highly concentrated in these firms: the average 
herfindahl shareholder concentration index amounts to 66.35%. 
To measure the theoretical constructs - control rents (erG),  entrepreneurial wealth (W), 
expected cash flows (Xc, XR, XG), asset liquidation value (L), average entrepreneurial quality (a) -
empirically, we make use of  proxy variables.  Control rents are measured by a dummy variable that 
is set to one when the company's name contains the name of  the entrepreneur(s) and zero 
otherwise.  Entrepreneurs who clearly identify themselves with their firm by assigning their name 
to the company can be expected to enjoy higher private benefits from control.  In addition, once the 
venture goes bankrupt, the reputation of the entrepreneur may be seriously damaged.  It is widely 
known that in Continental Europe and Japan, entrepreneurs who fail in their venture are stigmatized 
(e.g., Sahlman (1990».  Wright et al. (1997), for instance, find that longer established venture 
capitalists evaluate first-time and serial entrepreneurs differently and that previous entrepreneurial 
perfonnance influences the provision of  funds for serial entrepreneurs.  Reputation effects can be 
expected to be especially prevalent for entrepreneurs who can be readily recognized from their 
film's name.  In addition, we use the industry unemployment rate in the year preceding entry and 
the age of the entrepreneur at start-up to check the robustness of  our results.  In industries where 
unemployment rates are high, entrepreneurs may attribute a higher value to remaining in control, 
ceteris paribus.  Next, entrepreneurs of older age may be more risk averse (e.g., Evans and 
Jovanovic (1989»  and may have few job market opportunities once their venture fails (e.g., Scott, 
Berger and Garen (1995), Johnson and Neumark (1997».  We create a dummy variable that is set 
to one when the average age in the entrepreneurial team is above the sample median (34 years) and 
zero otherwise; we only have data on 64 start-ups to calculate this variable.  Since we have no 
information on the entrepreneurs' personal finances, we use the amount of  equity issued at start-up 
33 as a proxy for entrepreneurial wealth, though recognize that this proxy may be flawed.  The 
logarithm of  this variable is taken to avoid heteroscedasticity problems.  The start-up's expected 
cash flows are proxied by industry profitability, which is measured by EBITD relative to total 
assets during the year 1991, averaged across all firms in the corresponding industry.  The 
liquidation value of fiml assets is proxied by the percentage of  total assets that consist of  tangibles 
in the corresponding industry in 1991.  To measure average entrepreneurial quality, we use the 
industry failure (bankruptcy) rate of earlier start-ups, founded in  1988-1991.  Since late bankruptcy 
likely is related to factors other than an inherent quality deficiency, we follow these firms during 
the first three years subsequent to start-up.  Table III provides summary information on these proxy 
variables. 
For the purpose of  testing our theoretical model, we use logit regression analysis.  After all, 
the model predicts which entrepreneurs prefer to finance exclusively with bank debt rather than to 
raise a combination of bank and trade credit at start-up.  This feature can be captured best by 
constructing a dummy variable.  The dependent variable FULL BANK therefore is set to one when 
the entrepreneurial firm solely raises bank debt in the start-up year and zero otherwise.  However, 
when constructing this dummy variable, we need to take into account that suppliers may allow their 
customers to delay payment obligations during a certain period after delivery, without there being a 
cost associated with trade credit.  In fact, using bank debt to bridge this period would have an 
important opportunity cost.  As a result, not all firms with a positive ratio of  trade credit 
outstanding relative to purchases should be assigned a value of  zero for the variable FULL BANK. 
In our sample, 96.05% of firms have a non-zero value for the ratio of  trade credit to purchases. 
In the case of one-part credit terms, no discount is granted for early payment and full 
payment is due at the end of  the net period.  Then, it is in every firm's best interest to pay only at 
the end of that period.  In the case two-part credit terms are offered, firms receive a discount for 
prompt period, i.e. payment within the discount period.  From reported discount rates, it can be 
inferred that the implicit interest rate on trade credit is very high, making it an expensive source of 
34 financing.39  If  firms prefer to forego this discount, then full payment is due by the end of  the net 
period.  Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) find that a substantial fraction of  the firms in their sample do 
not permit customers to extend the net period and/or take unearned discounts.  Also, those suppliers 
that extend the net period and/or accept discounted payments during the net period are mostly 
willing to do so when the buyer has a long-standing relationship with them.  The latter condition 
certainly is not the case for newly established firms at the time of  start-up and, therefore, the 
industry trade credit standard can be used as the dividing line for firms that use versus firms that do 
not use expensive vendor financing.  A final concern may be that entrepreneurial firms experience a 
sudden boost in sales (and thus purchases) once the business gets on its cruising speed.  Then, the 
correction for the length of  the first accounting year - i.e., purchases are scaled to a horizon of 
twelve months - may not be satisfactory and may lead to substantial outliers for the ratio of 
accounts payable to purchases; accounts payable only relate to the latest purchases ofthe 
accounting period whereas purchases, after the correction, relate to the preceding 12 months. 
We first use o11e-part credit terms to determine whether start-ups use full versus partial 
bank finance.  Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) find that "Net 30" is by far the most commonly used 
one-part term.  Then, entrepreneurs are required to pay within 30 days after the invoice date and no 
discount is offered for earlier payment.  Under these conditions, it can be expected that firms will 
postpone their payments until day 30, without this having to imply that firms prefer to finance 
pal1ly with trade credit.  However, some firms may over-use trade credit, i.e. behind the granted 
period.  These firms are likely to incur high costs, partly through the signal that they are giving. 
The dependent variable FULL BANK, therefore, is set to one for start-ups with a positive amount 
of  bank debt and for whom the ratio of  accounts payable to purchases is below 0.0833 (=1112) and 
zero otherwise.  The results in Table IV indicate that the probability of financing exclusively with 
bank debt is lower for entrepreneurs who highly value control rights.  However, this is only 
significantly so when control rents are measured by means of  the name dummy variable (column 
'0 Frequently reported percentages indicate that the implicit interest rate on trade credit amounts to 44% (e.g., Biais and 
3S one).  Entrepreneurial age is likely to be also related to personal wealth, which might explain its 
insignificance in column two; personal wealth is expected to positively influence the probability of 
borrowing solely from banks at start-up.  In column three, the industry unemployment rate is not 
significantly related to the probability of  borrowing exclusively from the bank at start-up.  A 
possible explanation might be that high potential individuals are the ones that found their own firm. 
Then, industry unemployment rates may provide relatively few information on alternative 
employment opportunities.  Next, we find that the liquidation value of assets significantly reduces 
the likelihood that entrepreneurs finance exclusively with bank debt at start-up, ceteris paribUS. 
This result is consistent with the argument that entrepreneurs take into account that banks may 
adopt a harder liquidation policy for finns that default, especially when the liquidation value of 
assets is high.  Similar conclusions are obtained when using the percentage of assets that are 
relatively liquid (accounts receivable, cash and marketable securities) to measure the asset 
liquidation value (column four). 
The amount of  equity issued at start-up, industry profitability and industry failure risk, 
however, do not impact upon the debt structure.  The robustness of these results is discussed 
hereafter.  First, we have already suggested that the amount of equity issued at start-up may be a 
flawed measure of  entrepreneurial wealth.  For instance, entrepreneurs who contribute more equity 
at start-up may be more averse to taking risks because more of  their personal wealth is at stake. 
Then, the equity contribution made at start-np does not proxy for entrepreneurial wealth, but for 
entrepreneurial risk aversion.  When we include a dummy variable that is set to one when the 
entrepreneurial team consists of more than one member and zero otherwise, we observe that this 
variable is positively, though insignificantly related to the probability of borrowing exclusively 
from the bank.  The variable equity contribution now has a significant negative impact upon the 
probability of  raising only bank debt, ceteris paribus (column five).  This result is consistent with 
the theoretical model, demonstrating that individual risk aversion- captured by the risk premium A. 
Gallier (1997), Ng. Smith and Smith (1999)). 
36 - negatively influences the entrepreneur's choice to finance exclusively with bank debt.  Second, to 
test the robustness of the insignificant relation between industry profitability and the probability of 
full bank finance, we also calculate other measures of industry profitability, such as the ratio of  net 
income to total assets, but still fail to find that industry profitability affects the debt mix.  The same 
conclusion is obtained from using sales and the number of employees as the scaling variable. 
Third, we calculate the industry volatility of  cash flows to test the robustness of  the insignificant 
relation between the industry failure rate and the debt mix.  To correct for a time trend in the data, 
we use volatility of cash flow growth rates over 1988-1991, but continue to find that no relationship 
exists between the industry failure rate and the debt mix.  However, once we allow for a quadratic 
term in the industry failure rate, we find that entrepreneurs in industries where the failure rate of 
newly established firms is relatively high prefer to raise a combination of  bank debt and trade credit 
at start-up, ceteris paribus (column six).  The cuttoffvalue for the industry failure rate occurs at 
about 12.06%.  To deal with the above mentioned concern that some firms may exhibit a sudden 
take-off in sales by the end of  the first accounting period, we also report results considering only 
the firms that are assigned the same value for the dummy variable FULL BANK, when using data 
from the second accounting period.  These results are reported in column seven.  Finally, in column 
eight, we report the results from removing the firms with a ratio of accounts payable to purchases 
greater than one.  The results in column seven and eight essentially confirm earlier conclusions. 
Next, we use nvo-part credit terms to determine whether firms use full versus partial bank 
finance during the start-up year.  Chant and Walker (1988), Ng, Smith and Smith (1999) and others 
show that there is considerable variation across industries and little variation within industries with 
respect to two-part credit terms.  Therefore, using accounting data on the established firms in the 
industry, we calculate the industry trade credit standard.  This variable is defined as the mode of  the 
ratio of accounts payable to purchases of goods and services, computed across all industry 
incumbents in  1991.  As trade credit is an expensive source of finance, it can be expected that the 
more established and more creditworthy firms in the industry will largely take the discount for 
37 payment within the discount period.  Therefore, we only consider firms older than ten years and 
with no accumulated losses when calculating the industry standard.  The mode is used since it can 
be expected that even if  some of  these incumbents anticipate that they can extend their trade credit 
use behind the granted terms (e.g., Ng, Smith and Smith (1999», deviations from the standard will 
be arbitrarily.  In other words, there is no reason to expect firms in default on their trade credit and 
that decide to still fulfill their payment obligations to do so on the same day.  The dependent 
variable FULL BANK, therefore, is set to one for start-ups with a positive amount of  bank debt and 
for whom the ratio of  accounts payable to purchases is below the industry standard and zero 
otherwise.  In Panel B of  Table V, we use firms from the corresponding two-digit, respectively 
three-digit NACE industry to determine the industry standard.  Our earlier conclusions from Panel 
A are basically unaffected and, therefore, will not be repeated here.  Also, from comparing the 
adjusted R-square of  the models based one-part versus two-part credit terms, we can conclude that 
all models have a highly comparable explanatory power.  This result is not surprising given that for 
91.45% of  all start-ups, the three definitions of  the variable FULL BANK result in the same 
classification; in other words, vendor financing is either used scarcely or used abundantly by start-
ups. 
In Tables V and VI, we provide the results from split sample regression analysis, where we 
discern firms on the basis of  the liquidation value oftheir assets.  After all, it was argued in the 
previous section that the theoretical model only holds when the liquidation value of assets is high. 
To determine whether the asset liquidation value is high (low), we rank industries on the basis of 
the percentage of  industry assets that are liquid (accounts receivable, cash and marketable 
securities) and use the median of  this ranking variable to split the sample - above versus below the 
median.  These results are reported in Table V.  Likewise, we use the extent of  growth 
opportunities, which is measured by the average industry cash flow growth rate over 1988-1991, to 
compare start-ups; firms with substantial growth opportunities are likely to have a low assets' 
liquidation value, ceteris paribus.  These results are reported in Table VI. 
38 The results in Tables V and VI are qualitatively similar.  First, control rents significantly 
and negatively influence the likelihood of  borrowing exclusively from the bank, but only when 
assets are highly liquid and/or growth opportunities are limited.  Under these circumstances, the 
liquidation value of  firm assets can be expected to be relatively high, ceteris paribus.  Second, the 
equity contribution made at start-up negatively influences the likelihood of  contracting full bank 
finance, independent of  the liquidation value of  firm assets.  Third, the industry failure rate has a 
negative impact upon the probability of full bank finance, but only significantly so when the 
percentage of  total assets that consist of  liquid assets is relatively high.  Overall, these results are 
consistent with the predictions of  our model.  From comparing the adjusted R-square across the 
different models, we can conclude that our model does better in explaining the financing choice of 
firms in industries where the liquidation value of assets is relatively high. 
VI.  Conclusions 
The main point of  this paper is that entrepreneurs who contract debt to fmance their 
business venture not only consider the price of  the different sources of credit; they also take other 
costs into account.  We focus on the difference in liquidation policy of  various lenders and its 
implications for losing private benefits of  control.  It is shown that suppliers, due to a larger 
implicit equity stake in their customers, adopt a more lenient liquidation policy than banks, but 
chargc a higher price for their credit.  The entrepreneur, being uncertain about the success 
probability of  her venture, may then prefer to limit her bank borrowings at start-up to avoid a 
potential default against the bank later on. 
Given that the entrepreneur has brought in all her personal wealth as equity at start-up to 
meet the minimum equity contribution for limited liability firms, the fraction of  total finance that 
consists of  external debt versus internal equity cannot playa signaling role: the fraction of  total 
finance that is debt will be determined by the need for funds to fmance the project, which is 
39 unrelated to entrepreneurial quality for start-up firms.4o  Though, the fact that the entrepreneur 
borrows exclusively from the bank might be an important quality signal: when the firm's going 
concel11 value exceeds its liquidation value, we show that financial structure at start-up (i.e., the 
proportion of  debt finance that is bank versus trade credit) is irrelevant since both the bank and the 
supplier will prefer to reorganize following default.  On the other hand, if  the firm's liquidation 
value exceeds its going concem value, we show that entrepreneurs, depending on their perceived 
credit quality, may prefer a particular debt structure such that financiers can infer entrepreneurial 
quality. Entrepreneurs who face a low probability of  financial distress borrow exclusively from the 
bank to limit their financing expenses.  For these firms, the small chance that control rents will be 
lost following default does not offset the lower price of extel11al finance that is obtained by 
borrowing exclusively from the bank.  Entrepreneurs who face a high probability of financial 
distress, on the other hand, limit their bank borrowings in order to preserve control following 
default.  Then, default will only occur against the supplier, who will decide to reorganize the 
defaulted claims given his implicit equity stake in the firm. 
Given that the entrepreneur does not need to bring in all her personal wealth as equity at 
start  -up to meet the minimum equity contribution for limited liability firms, we find that the 
conclusions from the above model are preserved. When the firm's liquidation value exceeds its 
going concel11 value, the supplier's implicit equity stake again might induce entrepreneurs to adjust 
their capital structure.  Entrepreneurs with important control rents, for instance, may limit their 
bank borrowings such that default against the bank can always be circumvented.  However, by 
bringing in more equity and/or contracting more debt as bank finance at start-up, entrepreneurs who 
prefer to raise a combination of  bank and vendor financing may be able to further reduce the price 
of extel11al finance through the signal that they are giving.  Entrepreneurs who borrow exclusively 
from the bank, on the other hand, may be able to signal their higher quality by increasing their 
40  For incumbent firms, it can be expected that firms of  higher quality have been able to build up (more) financial slack 
(retained earnings). which would reduce their need for external funds to finance investment projects.  This relation is 
the basis for Myers' (1984) pecking order theory of  capital structure. 
40 equity contribution (and, thus, contracting less debt finance).  Simulations indicate that 
entrepreneurs of higher quality, with higher control rents, more personal wealth and a lower 
probability that the good state of nature will realize at time 2 following default at time I need to 
give a stronger quality signal in order for their signal to be credible.  Also, if entrepreneurs are 
extremely wealthy, we show that the fraction of  total finance provided by the entrepreneur (equity) 
can no longer play any signaling role.  On the other hand, if the firm's going concern value exceeds 
its liquidation value, entrepreneurs who face a low probability of financial distress now may be able 
to use the fraction of total finance that they provide (i.e., internal equity versus external debt) as a 
quality signal.  Then, the remaining finance needed will be borrowed exclusively from the bank to 
obtain the lowest price for external financing.  Also, entrepreneurs who face a high probability of 
financial distress will be indifferent between contracting bank versus supplier finance as both 
creditors will charge the same price for credit. 
Overall, these results stress the crucial role played by the relation between the liquidation 
value of firm assets and the firm's going concern value.  We explicitly demonstrate that the 
supplier's implicit equity stake only has specific implications for the debt structure of  start-ups 
when the liquidation value of assets is relatively high when compared to the firm's going concern 
value.  As a result, our model mainly has implications for start-ups in traditional industrial sectors. 
The debt structure of  start-ups in new sectors where intangibles play an important role, such as 
biotechnology, information technology, etc. cannot be explained by this model.  For these firms, 
the liquidation value of assets is likely to be relatively low.  Furthennore, these firms are likely to 
be financed with equity (venture capital) rather than with debt financing. 
41 Table 1:  Industry distribution of sample firms 
This Table represents the number of sample firms that start up  in each two-digitNACE industry. 
NACE  Description  Number of firms 
22  Production and preliminary processing of  metals  I firm 
23  Extraction of minerals other than metalliferous and energy-producing  I firm 
minerals; peat extraction 
24  Manufacture of non-metallic mineral products  2 firms 
25  Chemical industry  4 firms 
31  Manufacture of metal articles (except for mechanical, electrical and  9 firms 
instrument engineering and vehicles) 
32  Mechanical engineering  5 firms 
34  Electrical engineering  7 finns 
36  Manufacture of  other means of transport  I firm 
37  Instrument engineering  4 firms 
41142  Food, drink and tobacco industry  20 firms 
43  Textile industry  9 firms 
44  Leather and leather goods industry (except footwear and clothing)  3 firms 
45  Footwear and clothing industry  13 firms 
46  Timber and wooden furniture industries  17 firms 
47  Manufacture of  paper and paper products; printing and publishing  44 firms 
48  Processing of  rubber and plastics  4 firms 
49  Other manufacturing industries  8 firms 
TOTAL  152 firms 
42 Table II: Summary statistics on finn start-up size, initial financial structure and ownership structure 
This Table represents summary statistics on variables that represent firm start-up size, initial financial structure and 
ownership structure.  Firm start-up size is measured in terms of  number of  employees, total resources and total assets in 
the start-up year.  Leverage is the ratio of  total, externally raised debt to total resources in the start-up year.  Initial 
resources do nol incorporate the operational results realized during the first year, whereas loans provided by the 
entrepreneurs to their firm are considered as equity fmance.  Short-term debt consists of debt with a maturity not 
exceeding one year, and shareholder concentration is measured by the herfindahl shareholder concentration index. 
Variable  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Std. dev 
START-UP SIZE 
Number of employees  2.6993  I  0  18  3.6958 
Total resources  198262€  89068€  4908€  2656006€  337049€2 
Total assets  185626€  85945€  2454€  2352212€  315849P 
INITIAL FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 
Leverage  0.6897  0.7710  0  0.9915  0.2487 
Bank debt/total debt  0.3078  0.2688  0  0.9810  0.2945 
Bank debt/total debt if positive  0.4372  0.4504  0.0022  0.9810  0.2577 
Short-term debt/total debt  0.6864  0.7568  0.0180  1  0.3080 
Short-term hank debt/bank debt  0.2664  0  0  1  0.3828 
OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
Shareholder concentration  0.6635  0.52  0.1534  I  0.2677 
Table III: Summary statistics on explanatory and control variables 
This Table represents summary statistics on explanatory and control variables.  Name dummy is set to one if  the name 
of the finn contains the name of  the entrepreneur(s) and zero otherwise.  The industry unemployment rate represents 
the unemployment rate in the corresponding industry during the year preceding entry.  The entrepreneurial age dummy 
is set to one when the mean age in the entrepreneurial team exceeds the median and zero otherwise. 
Variable  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Std. dev 
CONTROL RENTS (c'G) 
Name dummy  0.2418  0  0  I  0.4296 
Industry unemployment rate  0.1063  0.0865  0.0200  0.4350  0.0616 
Entrepreneurial age dummy  0.4918  0  0  1  0.5041 
ENTREPR.WEALTH(W) 
Logarithm of equity  6.5540  6.6201  4.0943  10.0433  1.0101 
EXP. CASH FLOWS (XG' XB, X'  G) 
Industry EBITD/total assets  0.1559  0.1561  -0.1045  0.5901  0.0790 
Industry net income/total assets  0.0177  0.0096  -0.0460  0.0934  0.0143 
ASSET LIQUIDATION VALUE (L) 
Ind  ustry tangible assets/total assets  0.7089  0.7171  0.2752  0.8767  0.1303 
Industry liquid assets/total assets  0.4292  0.4414  0.0877  0.8013  0.0990 
AVERAGE ENTREPR.QUALITY (a.) 
Industry start-up failure rate  0.0563  0.0551  0  0.5  0.0505 
Industry cash flow growth volatility  0.4611  0.3503  0.0509  2.5851  0.3551 
43 Table IV:  Logit regression results 
Panel A of this Table represents various models where the net term "Net 30" is  used to determine whether start-up firms  borrow exclusively from the bank (FULL BANK - I), 
respectively raise a combination of bank debt and vendor financing (FULL BANK ~  0),  The model estimates the probability of borrowing solely from the bank at start-up.  [n 
column one,  control rents are measured  by  a dummy variable that is  set to one when the company name contains the name of the entrepreneur and zero otherwise, the  equity 
contribution is measured by the logarithm of issued equity, industry profitability is measured by EBITD to total assets averaged across all firms in the corresponding industry in 
1991, the liquidation value of firm assets is measured by the percentage of total assets that consist of tangibles in the corresponding industry, industry failure risk is  measured by 
the bankruptcy rate of  earlier start-ups.  [n column two and three, the industry unemployment rate, respectively the average age in the entrepreneurial team are used to proxy for 
entrepreneurial control rcnts.  In column four, the asset liquidation value is  measured by the percentage of firm  assets that are liquid (accounts receivable, cash and marketable 
securities).  In column five, a dummy variable is added that is set to one when the entrepreneurial team consists of  more than one member and zero otherwise. [n column six, we 
allow for a quadratic tertn in the industry failure rate.  In column seven and eight, we remove firms that may have a biased value for the ratio accounts payable to purchases (and 
thus for the dummy variable FULL BANK) from the sample.  In  column seven, we remove firms  that are classified differently using second year accounting data, whereas in 
column eight, we remove firms  for whom the ratio of accounts payable relative to purchases is above one,  Panel B of this Table represents results where the industry standard 
for accounts payable relative to purchases at the two-digit, respectively three-digit industry level is used to detennine the dividing line for the dummy variable FULL BANK. 
PANEL A  PANELB 




Number of  shareholders 
Industry profitability 
Liquidation value of  assets 
Industry failure risk 
(Industry failure risk)' 
Number of  observations 
Adjusted R-square 
***: significant at 1% 
**:  significant at 5% 
*: significant at 10% 
5.4876**  4.4830* 
-1.7000**  -0.3290 
-0.6206  -0.5616 
-0.3814  -0.5278 
-3.5290**  -3,0048* 
-0.5939  0.1136 
152  152 
0.0878  0,0456 
6.1305**  5.7425*  11.4129*** 
-0.5577  -1.6477**  -2.0020*' 
-0.9947  -0.7036*  -1.3885** 
0,0317 
-9.1537  -1.8616  -0.6147 
0,6512  -4.4035*  -4.2491 ** 
6.4308  0.6173  -2.0246 
64  152  152 
0.0806  0.0807  0.1240 
44 
2 digit  3 digit 
11.6525**  11.1379**  12.1629***  10.5642**  11.1495*** 
-2.0633**  -1.8926*  -2.0753**  -1.2324**  -1.0664* 
-1.4464**  -1.4058**  -1.4673**  -1.4051 ***  -1.3712*** 
0.0301  0.1711  -0.0878  0.3515  0.1024 
-0.5035  -0.8802  -0.1597  -0.9724  -0.5758 
-5.6545**  -5.1133**  -6.1222**  -3.8639*'  -4.9419*** 
0.4712'  0.4304*  0.4797*  0.4299**  0.3733* 
-3.9065*  -3.4739*  -3.8749*  -3.8041 **  -3.3305* 
152  123  137  152  152 
0.1561  0.1573  0.1642  0.1471  0.1401 Table V: Logit regression results - split sample regression results 
This  Table represents the  model  of column six  of the  Table  IV,  but where  the sample  is  split on  the  basis  of the 
liquidation  value  of firm  assets.  The  industry  average of the variable  liquid  assets  (accounts  receivable,  cash  and 
marketable securities) to total assets is used to split the sample. 
Industry liquid assets/total assets 
LOW  p-value  IDGH  p-value 
Intercept  16.6286  0.0516  9.3900  0.1273 
Control rents  -1.2044  0.3873  -2.5426  0.0262 
Equity contribution  -2.1241  0.0487  -1.3076  0.1326 
Number of shareholders  -0.8483  0.3055  0.5988  0.5011 
Industry profitability  -7.8337  0.3674  0.1483  0.9633 
Liquidation value of  assets  -2.3388  0.5861  -5.4308  0.1346 
Industry failure risk  0.2282  0.6907  0.7043  0.0568 
(Ind  ustry failure risk)'  -4.0925  0.5423  -5.3990  0.0475 
Adjusted R-square  0.1120  0.2375 
Table VI: Logit regression results - split sample regression results 
This  Table represents the  model of column six of the  Table  IV,  but where the  sample  is  split on  the  basis  of the 
liquidation value affirm assets.  The industry average of  the cash flow growth rate is used to split the sample. 
Industry growth opportunities (historical cash flow growth) 
LOW  p-value  IDGH  p-value 
Intercept  13.6636  0.0670  10.6569  0.0507 
Control rents  -2.3786  0.0852  -0.5674  0.5236 
Equity contribution  -1.8502  0.0682  -1.1424  0.1106 
Number of  shareholders  -0.6933  0.3520  0.6258  0.4992 
Industry profitability  -8.8163  0.1221  2.4838  0.5549 
Liquidation value of assets  -1.4613  0.5983  -8.2595  0.0192 
Industry failure risk  0.3138  0.2908  0.2601  0.4257 
(Industry failure risk)'  -3.1173  0.1898  -2.2035  0.4309 
Ad.justed R-square  0.1861  0.1373 
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48 Appendix 1: separating 7r* 
In this Appendix, the incentive compatibility constraints for a separating equilibrium where 
high quality entrepreneurs borrow exclusively from the bank and low quality entrepreneurs contract 
partial bank finance are derived.  If  an entrepreneur borrows exclusively from the bank (a = 0) then 
in  a separating equilibrium, the  bank infers  7r  =  7rH  and  charges the  corresponding bank rate RbH 
while if she contracts partial bank finance  (a > 0) then both creditors infer 7r  =  7rL  and charge the 
bank rate RhL, respectively supplier rate RtL.  The truth telling conditions for  a high, respectively 
low quality entrepreneur imply the following boundary condition on entrepreneurial quality: 
Truth telling condition for an entrepreneur with 7r =  7rH: 
7r H In{ I + lxu + L - RbI! 1  }+ (1-7r  I!) In{  I } 
> 7r H In{ 1  + [Xc; +L -X  BRbL -(1- X B)R 'L l}+ (1-7rI!)c5 In{ I + kG]}+ (1-7rH )(l-c5)ln{ 1 ) 
(expected utility from setting a =  0 > expected utility from setting a =  (1 - X8)) 
{  r  y  In  1+ c  G 
where RbH is set to achieve zero expected profits (i.e., the expected payoff from the loan  7rH RbH  + 
(1- 7rH)(XS + L) should equal the amount initially invested of€1) or 
h  (1-7r  I! )(X  B + L) 
R H =I/7r 1! 
7rH 
RbL  is set to achieve zero expected profits (i.e., the expected payoff from the loan 7r0sRbL + 
(1 - 7rLlXsRbL should equal the amount initially invested of  €XS) or 
Rh'.  = I 
RtL  is  set  to  achieve  zero  expected  profits  (i.e.,  the  expected  payoff  from  the  loan 
7rL(1  - Xs)RtL  + (1  - 7rL)tSJ(  G should equal the amount initially invested of  €(I - Xs»  or 
R'L  =I/7r, _ (l-7r,Jc5X'c; 
7rt (I-Xn) 
Truth telling condition[or an entrepreneur with 7r =  7rL: 
7r,ln{I+[Xt; +L_RhH ] }+(l-7rt)ln{ I) 
< 7r, In{ 1  + [x,; + L - XBR hL  - (1- X B)R 'L l}+ (l-7rJc5ln{ 1  + kG l}+ (l-7r,.)(1-c5)ln{ 1 ) 
(expected utility/rom setting a =  0 < expected utility from setting a =  (J - XFJJ) 
49 In{ I+e'c; y 
Appendix 2: first order derivatives 
The following formula was derived to determine the cutoff JZ"*: 
*_  In{l+e'uY 
JZ"  - In {I + Xu + L - RbH }-In{ I + Xc;  + L - Xn  - (1-Xn)R'L}+ In{ I + e"(i Y 
Below, we show that oJZ"*loRIL < 0, oJZ"*loRbH > 0, OJf*18XG > 0, oJZ"*!oXa > 0, oJZ"*!8X  G > 0, 
oJZ"*/OerG> °  and 8  JZ"*/O 0 > 0.  The sign of orr*loL is not unambiguously clear. 
-In  I+e'c;  hH  {  } s[  -I  J 
I+X  +L-R 
orr */OR bH  =  G  8  2  > ° 
[In{ I+Xu +L_RhH}_ln{ l+XG +L-XB -(1-XB )R'! }+1n{ I+e'e;}  ] 
- 11  I+e ('  1  {  r  }s[  1  I  J 
,  I+X. +L_RhH  l+X  +L-X -(J-X )Rti, 
orr*/ax, =  c,  e;  B  B  >0 
I,  [In{ I + XCi  + L - RhH }-111{ 1 + Xc;  +L -X  B - (l-Xn)R'!}+ In{ 1 + e'e; Y  ]2 
with 
-I  + R'! + [(1- X B )(I-rr  L)OX'G ]/[rrl• (1- X n)2]J 
l+Xc; +L-Xn -(I-Xn)R'L 
1/.  (I-XJ:/)(I-lrL)SrrC ;  [  (I-,T! )c5XI'G]  (I-JrL)oxr(i 
-1 +  f?  +  JrL(1-XR/  '" -\ +  V"I.- JfL(~-XB)  +  lI'L(1-XB ) 
==  (1-JrJ)/1!!4 
50 I  {I  I'  }Ol  I  1  - n  +c  u 
(I+X, +L_RhH)~ (I+X  +L-X -(I-X )RIL)_l£_,_ 
u  (1-1£  H)  C;  R  B  (1-1£},) 
----~----~----------------~------------------------_r_--~) 
~n{ I  +  Xc; +  L- RhH }-In{ I  +  Xc; +  L - X B -(1- Xa)R'L}+ In{ I  +c"c; Y  r 
-In{l+c
1
'('}"[  I  I] 
,  1£  (1+X. +L_RhH)  I+X  +L-X -(I-X )R'L  =  H  G  G  B  B  >< 0 
~n{ I+Xc; +L_RhH}_ln{ I+XG +L-XR -(I-Xa)R'L }+In{ l+crG y  r 
5[ln{i +  Xc;  +L_RhH }-In{I+Xc; +L-XB -(1-Xa)R"'} 1 
o,,*!ocl'u =  (1+cl'G)  >0 
[In{I +  Xc; +L_RhH }-In{ I+Xc; +L-Xn -(I-XB)R'" }+In{ I+cl'c; y  r 
Appendix 3: a strictly constrained entrepreneur with 0)(  G >  L 
Both creditors will decide to reorganize in the bad state of  nature at time I given that t5)(  G <: 
L.  Consequently, entrepreneurs need no protection against the strict liquidation policy of the bank 
51 and the supplier's implicit equity stake does not play any special role.  As a result, the high quality 
strictly constrained entrepreneur cannot use the  fraction of debt finance that is  bank debt versus 
trade credit to signal her higher quality.  Also,  as  she  is  strictly constrained, she camlOt  bring in 
additional equity at start-up to signal her higher quality.  The only equilibrium that is possible then 
is  a  pooling  equilibrium  where  entrepreneurs  are  indifferent  between  contracting  bank  versus 
supplier finance and where both creditors charge the same price for credit.  The price for credit He 
(wherej =  b for the bank;j =  t for the supplier) will be set to break even in the credit market: 
R /H  = 1/8 _ -'..(1_-_8--,-)-,--(  X---,T  8,-+_5X_'_"  "--,-) 
8 
Appendix 4: constraints on IV 
with B  =  alrH + (1 - a)lrL 
In this Appendix, we show that if creditors anticipate that an entrepreneur who contracts (XB 
+ w) of  bank debt will not bring in w once the bad state of  nature realizes to ward off liquidation by 
the bank, it  is  in the entrepreneur's best interest to contract only XB  rather than (XB + w) of bank 
debt at start-up. 
As w will not be brought in in the bad state of  nature, contracting (XB + w) of  bank debt 
does not reveal any (positive) information about entrepreneurial quality.  Consequently, creditors 
will not adjust their price for credit and the entrepreneur will not be able to obtain a lower cost of 
finance by contracting more debt finance as bank debt.  Once the bad state of  nature realizes, the 
firm will default against the bank, who will decide to liquidate given that 5X"G < L.  As a result, the 
entrepreneur is better off when borrowing exclusively from the bank as henceforth only the good 
state of nature matters.  However, the starting point was that the entrepreneur is better off  when 
contracting partial rather than full bank finance.  Then, she will have no incentive to contract more 
bank debt than XB at start-up.  To proof our assertion, we need to show that the following condition 
holds: 
52 where: 
Jr, In{ 1 + [XI;  + L - (X  R + w)Rbe,nc"  - (1- X s - w)R,e""" + W]  }+ (1-n-,)ln( 1+ [W]  ) 
<  1[, In{ 1 + [Xc;  + L - X SR h8,old  - (1- Xs)R,O,Old  + W]  }+ (1-1[,)0 In{ 1  + kG + W] } 
+(1-1[,)(1-0) In{  1+[W]} 
(expected utility  from settmg a =  (l - .XIJ - lrJ  -< expeCled IItility from setting a =  (1 - X,J) 
RhB,IIId  =1, R,R,IIld  =1/8- (I-e)oX"(; 
8(I-XB) 
The total fmancing cost RO , "'w for €l of debt finance given that the entrepreneur contracts (XB  + w) of bank 
de bt and (I  - Xu - w) of trade credit and given that she is  not going to  bring in  w in the bad state - after which 
the finn will be liquidated - is set such that both the bank and the supplier earn zero rents:" 
R O,m'"  --1/8-(l-e)(Xs +L) 
8 
() =  WtH + (/ - a);rJ, if  the equilibrium is pooling 
() =  ;rl, ifthe equilibrium is separating 
Jr; In{ I+X" +L-lje+ (l-e)(:B +L) +W } + (1-1[,)ln{ 1 +W) 
<  1[, In{ I+X" +L-XB - (1-:B) + (I-8~0X'r; +W }+(I-1[')oln{l+C'r; +W} 
+ (1-1[, )(1-0) In { 1  + W } 
The above derived condition always holds, independent of whether the equilibrium is  pooling or 
separating: 
•  If the equilibrium is  pooling, it must be that both low and high quality entrepreneurs prefer 
partial bank finance to full bank finance: 
Jr, In{ 1 + Xc;  + L -lje  + (1-8)(:B +L) + W  } +(I-1[,)ln{ 1 + W  } 
{  (I-X)  (I-e)oX',}  {  }  <  Jr, In  I+X" +L-XB ---8- B-+  e  '+W  +(I-1[;)oln  l+c'o +W 
+ (1-1[, )(1-0) In { 1  +  W  } 
(expected u(llityjrom setting a =  () < expected ulilityfrom setting a =  (1  -){IJJ 
which is identical to the above derived condition, which therefore is satisfied. 
If the equilibrium is  separating,  it must be that low quality entrepreneurs prefer a  financial 
structure  where  they  are  identified  as  low  quality  to  a  financial  structure  where  they  are 
identified as high quality: 
"  Note that here, we do not split up the total financing cost into a price for bank debt RhO. "'"  and a price for trade credit 
R'IJ """': in order to be able to do so, we should make some assumptions on the relative priority of  bank debt and trade 
credit and on the entrepreneur's distribution of  XB among the creditors at time I, while these assumptions are irrelevant 
for the remaining of our paper since priority issues do not impact on the results of our paper. See also foomote 27. 
53 lllln{ I+X" +L-l  *  RhH  +W}+(l-ll)ln{ I+W} 
<  lllln{ 1  + Xu + L - X H *  RI,I. -(1- X B) *  R'L + W}+ (l-ll/.)8In{ l+c"c; + W} 
+(I-ll/)(l-o)ln{ I+W) 
where: 
R"H  = l/llH _ (l-llH)(XH +L) 
llH 
Rhi.  = 1,  R tl. = I/lli•  _  (1-llL )bX,·c; 
ll/.(l-XB) 
(expected uti/;tyfrom selling a = 0 < expected utililyfrom setting a = (l- ..  YiJ) 
III In{ 1  + Xli +L -l/ll  H + (l-ll  H  :~B  +L) +W} +(I-llL)ln{ 1+ W  ) 
< lll.ln{ I+X(; +L-XH - (l-XB) + (l-llL)bX'c; +W}+(1-llIJ81n{I+C'G +W}  II  r.  lli. 
+(I-lll,)(l-8)ln{1+W} 
ll/. In{ 1  + Xl; +L -l/(J+ (1-O)(:B +L) + W} + (l-llrJln{ I+W } 
{  (1-X)  (1-8)bX' G}  {  }  <  lll.ln  I+XIi +L-XB __  -O_B_+  8  '+W  +(I-llL)81n  l+c'" +W 
+(1-lll)(1-8)ln{I+W} 
which is identical to the above derived condition, which therefore is satisfied. 
Appendix 5: incentil'e conditions 
Both high and low quality entrepreneurs have no incentive to bring in more equity than the 
legal minimum if the following conditions are satisfied for a high, respectively a low quality 
entrepreneur: 
lfH  In\l+[X,; +L_R"H."IJ +W]}+(1-lfH)ln{l+[W]} 
> 7TH  In{ 1  + [Xc;  +L _(i_W)R"H"ww + (W -w)]}+ (l-lfH)ln{ 1  +[W -wI} 
(expected utilityfrom bringing in the minimum equity contribution required by law 
> expected utility/rom bringing in an amount ofequityw in addition 10 the minimum required by law) 
where: 
54 RhH,o'd  =1/TrH  _ (l-TrH)(Xn +L) 
TrH 
RhH,II'W  = 1/Tr H _ (1- Tr H  )(X  B + L) 
TrH(J-W) 
which is satisfied 
and 
RfJ.,1J1d 
trl. In{ 1 + [Xc;  + L - X HR'L,,,ld  - (1- X B )R,'  .. old  + W]}+ (I-1I",Jo In{ 1 + [e' G  + W]} 
+ (I - tr I, )(1 - 0) In { 1 + [W] } 
> trL  In{ 1 + [XG  + L - XBR'L,n,,,  - (1-X H  - w)R'/.''''w  + (W - w»)) 
+(l-tr,)Oln{J + [c'  G  +(W -w)]}+(I-trL)(l-O)ln{ l+[W -w]) 
(ex.pected utility from bringing in the minimum equity contribution required by law 
where: 
> expected utilityfrom bringing in an amount ofequityw in addition to the minimum required by law) 
(J-1I"L)bX"o 
1Z"L(l-XB) 
R""''''''=l  R'L.n'W=l/Tr  _  (l-1Z"L)bX'o 
,  I,  TrL(l-Xn -w) 
which can be simplified to: 
{  (I-X)  (1-11"  )bX'o}  {  }  tr,.ln  I+Xr, +L-Xn ___  B_+  L  +W  +(I-trIJoln I+c'o +W  +(I-trL)(l-o) 
trl.  tr L 
>11"  In{J+x.+L-X  _(l-XH)+(I-tr,)bX'n +W+w(l-trd } 
I.  (,  R 
tr L  tr"  trl. 
+(l-trl)o  In{ 1 +e'c; + W -w }+(I-trL)(l-O)ln{ I +W -w } 
which is satisfied 
A low quality entrepreneur has no incentive to contract more bank debt than XB if  the 
following condition is satisfied: 
55 RIf.p/d 
7r,  In{ 1+ lx,;  + L - (X  H + w)Rb/",,,,,  - (1- X R  - w)R'J.,new  + w  n+ (1- 7r1. )5In{ 1+ [c'G  + (W - w)j} 
+ (I - 7r 1.)(1  - 5)  In{ I + [W - w] } 
<7l',  In{ 1+ [Xc;  + L -XHRhL,"'d -(1-X")R'L,,,'d +W]}+(I-7r,)8In{I+[c'"  +W]) 
+ (1-7r,)(I-8)ln{ I +[W]} 
where: 
(expecled ulilifyjrom selling (J - oj =  (Xs  + 11')  ..:::  expected utility from setting (/ - a)  =  Xll) 
(l-JZ'L)JXrC; 
JZ'L (I-XB) 
which can be simplified to: 
{
"  T  (1- X B)  (1- 7r L  )OX'  G  W  w(l- 7r L)  }  7r"ln  I+A,;+L-.Y. H----+  +  +--'---"-'-
ff1•  1t'l,  JrL 
+(1-7l', )8In{ 1  +c'c; +W -11' }+(l-7r,J(I-8)ln{ I+W -w} 
{ 
(1-XH)  (I-7rL )OX'c  } 
<7r,ln  I+X(; +L-XB ---,-+  +W 
Jr  J  1[1. 
+ (I-7l',)8In{ 1+ c"" + W  }+ (1-7rJ.)(I- 8) In{ 1 + W} 
which is satisfied, 
Append;:'.:: 6: a weakly constrained entrepreneur with J)(  G > L 
Following default  at  time  I,  the  impaired  financial  claims  will  be reorganized  for  sure, 
without entrepreneurs having to bring in additional equity given that (j){  G ;:: 1.  As a result, external 
financiers anticipate that entrepreneurs, who act in their self-interest, will never bring in additional 
equity at time I once the bad state of  nature realizes, 
However,  the  fact  that  the  entrepreneur  is  no  longer  constrained  at  W =  0  might have 
implications  for  capital  structure  in  terms  of total  finance  that  is  debt  versus  equity:  the 
entrepreneur no longer needs to limit her equity contribution to the minimum required by law,  By 
bringing in more equity at start-up, a high quality entrepreneur might be able to  dissociate herself 
from lower quality ones,  Depending on whether or not the high quality entrepreneur only brings in 
the  legal  minimum,  a  pooling  respectively  separating  equilibrium  can  result.  In  the  resulting 
56 separating equilibrium, high quality entrepreneurs borrow exclusively from the bank because only 
the bank's price of credit will reflect their credit risk.  As the supplier henceforth only attracts low 
quality  entrepreneurs,  he  will  adjust  his  price  for  trade  credit  upwards.  Then,  low  quality 
entrepreneurs become indifferent between contracting bank debt, trade credit or some combination 
of both.  In  the separating equilibrium, we find that when 1rL  lies in the interval [0,  1r*[ and 1rfl lies 
in the interval ]1r*,  I], where 
1r*= In{l+c'" +W}" -In{l+c'c; +W-w}" +In{ I+WV'-8) -In{ I+W-WjC'-J) 
[
In{ 1+ Xu +L -(I-w)RbH  + W -w}+ln{ l+c'(J + W)" + In{ 1 +WjCl-Oi] 
-In{ I+X" +L -R'I. + W}+ln{ l+c'  G  + W -w}" -In{ 1+ W _w)l'-O' 
R il  = 1/  1r  I.  (1- 1r  I. )(  X B + 5X'  G)  j ~  b, t 
1r1. 
R hH  --I/~H _  (l-1r  H )(XB + 5X'c;) 
"  (if(l-w)R,H>XB +8X'G)  or 
1r  H (1-w) 
it is optimal for the low quality entrepreneur to bring in only minimum equity at start-up, while for 
the high quality entrepreneur, it is optimal to contribute some equity w beyond the legal minimum. 
As  entrepreneurs  are  risk  averse,  the  high  quality  weakly  constrained entrepreneur  will 
choose  the  smallest w that allows  dissociation from  low quality  entrepreneurs.  Then,  w is  set 
according to the following equality: 
1r H In{! + Xu + L - RIL + W}+ (1-1rH )5In{ 1  + [c'e; + W]}+ (l-1r  H  )(1-5)ln{ 1 + [W]} 
1rH  In{ 1  + Xu + L - (1- W)RhH  + (W -w)  }+(I-1r/i  )5In{ I + [c'e; + (W - w)]} 
+ (I-1rfl )(1-5)ln{ 1  + [W -11'] } 
As  ]V  is  a nonlinear function  of the  different  parameters of the model,  we  are  unable  to  give  a' 
closed-form  solution  formula  for  w.  Therefore,  below,  we  give  an  overview  of some  of our 
simulations used to determine w.  The conditions that are imposed on the solution for 11'  are:  11' s;  W 
and W 2 O.  We find that 11' is decreasing in 1rL, XG , XB, L, XG and 5 and increasing in 1rfl, c'  G and W. 
This implies that entrepreneurs of higher quality, with higher control rents, more personal wealth, 
projects that have a lower payoff (XG,  XB and/or X' G)  or liquidation value and a lower probability 
57 that the good state of  nature will realize at time 2 following default at time I need to give a stronger 
quality signal in order for their signal to be credible. 
Varying  1[/  J[H  Xu  XH  L  Xc;  5 
,. 
Cc;  W  Snlution  for  11' 
parameter  (11'  Era,  WI) 
1[,  0.7  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0 
0.6  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.131142 
0.5  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.289627 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.48886 
0.3  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  no feasible solution 
0.2  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  no feasible solution 
0.1  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  no feasible solution 
1[.  0.4  1.0  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  no feasible solution 
0.4  0.9  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  no feasible solution 
0.4  0.8  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  no feasible solution 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.48886 
0.4  0.6  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.281802 
0.4  0.5  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.127781 
0.4  0.4  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0 
X·  0.4  0.7  5.0  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.281039 
0.4  0.7  4.5  0.6  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.315594 
0.4  0.7  4.0  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.359114 
0.4  0.7  3.5  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.415097 
0.4  0.7  3.0  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.48886 
0.4  0.7  2.5  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.588277 
0.4  0.7  2.0  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  no feasible solution 
X·  0.4  0.7  3  0.8  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  no feasible solution 
0.4  0.7  3  0.7  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.130661 
0.4  0.7  3  0.6  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.322109 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.48886 
0.4  0.7  3  0.4  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.636691 
0.4  0.7  3  0.3  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  no feasible solution 
0.4  0.7  3  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  no feasible solution 
L  0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.24  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.48214 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.22  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.485478 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.20  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.48886 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.18  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.492282 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.16  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.495746 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.14  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.499254 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.12  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.502797 
X  0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.8  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.045124 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.7  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.171318 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.6  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.28605 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.5  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.391397 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.48886 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.3  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.579561 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.2  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.664345 
5  0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.9  0.3  0.7  0.311774 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.8  0.3  0.7  0.37735 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.7  0.3  0.7  0.435989 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.48886 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.5  0.3  0.7  0.536849 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.7  0.580655 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.62086 
c 
,. 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.7  0.7  0.565256 
58 0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.547093 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.5  0.7  0.528311 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.4  0.7  0.508895 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.48886 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.2  0.7  0.468219 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.1  0.7  0.446988 
Tf'  0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.9  0.534756 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.8  0.511951 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.7  0.48886 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.6  0.465475 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.5  0.441778 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.4  0.41775 
0.4  0.7  3  0.5  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.3  0.3  0.393368 
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